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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
WAGE PRIORITY IN BANKRUPTCY
C. SCOTr PRYOR*
In its 2006 6-3 decision in Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co., the Supreme Court declined to extend the bankruptcy priority for employee
benefits to premiums due for workers' compensation insurance. Neither the
majority nor the dissent looked back further than decisions in 1959 and 1968, both
of which had held with the same 6-3 vote that employee benefits should not be
accorded priority as wages under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. However, the wage
priority had an intriguing history and represents a distinctive normative policy with
respect to wage earners and their families, a history and policy ignored by the
Court in 2006.
The wage priority first appeared in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 where it
represented a political gambit by the recently-formed Whig party to garner the
support of socially active Christian evangelicals. The rise of industrialism and the
market economy following the War of 1812 had forever changed the agrarian-
artisan small community ideal of the Founding Era. Concurrently with the
continuing Second Great Awakening and evangelical revivalism, the market
revolution drew the attention of commercial writers who, drawing on widespread
biblical literacy, framed the issues of business success and failure in explicitly
moral terms. The recently formed Whig party made a bankruptcy law part of a
platform in 1840 that helped propel them to brief political success.
The wage priority lived on in the Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and 1898 and the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 where it lost its religious moorings but retained a moral
foundation: to protect those most at risk from a political economy that was ever
more individualistic and market driven. Courts, including the Supreme Court,
regularly cited this policy until 2006 when it disappeared without explanation.
INTRODUCTION
Debate about priorities among creditors has extended for over twenty years and,
while slowing, hasn't ended in a consensus. Most of the focus of this debate has
been on secured credit.1 But secured credit persists notwithstanding various
academic criticisms about it.
2
* Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. J.D. 1980, University of Wisconsin Law School.
M.A. 1997, Reformed Theological Seminary. Thanks are due to many including David Epstein and John C.
McCoid, H for their comments on an earlier draft and David Skeel and Craig Stern for their remarks on a
later version. The research and editorial assistance of Bill Magee, Bethany Flitton, and Michael Butler was a
great help. I must also thank Regent Law School and the American Center for Law and Justice for their
financial support for this project. Any errors and misstatements are, of course, my own.
For a selection of articles arguing against full priority for secured credit see Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994) (arguing involuntary creditors should have
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The interesting questions about priority thus shift to the variegated world of
unsecured credit. And the battlefield for such priority fights today is in the
Bankruptcy Code. If secured creditors can take all the pie for which they've
contracted, do the remaining unsecured creditors share the pie equally? Or, are
some unsecured creditors more equal than others? The answer to the latter
questions is of course yes. Beginning with section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841
Congress determined that one sort of unsecured creditors-employees-have
statutory priority over other unsecured creditors in the event of bankruptcy.
3
Not much has been written about the history or justification for this statutory
priority.4 Granting that secured creditors will enjoy the fruits of their consensual
interests in a debtor's property, why should any creditor who has not contracted for
priority nonetheless obtain it? Could the wage priority be efficient? Or is this
priority better explained by principles outside the sphere of the market? Part I of
this Article summarizes the legal history of the wage priority in bankruptcy
beginning with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. With barely an acknowledgement of
priority among creditors in 1800, we will see a process of ever-increasing
legislative growth in the protection of employees in America's bankruptcy law. We
priority over secured creditors); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy With Imperfect Information: The Article 9
Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373 (1997) (discussing expansion of priority for commercial
lenders); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and
Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1349 (1997)
(considering costs and benefits of subordinating secured creditors to unsecured or tort claimants in
bankruptcy).
2 For some articles supporting contractual secured priority see Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope of
Revised Article 9 Is Justified, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 328 (1996); Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L.
REv. 2021, 2024 (1994) (pointing out positive aspects of engaging in secured transactions); Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285
(1990). For others commenting on the place of secured credit in today's political economy see C. Scott
Pryor, How Revised Article 9 Will Turn the Trustee's Strong Arm Into a Weak Finger: A Potpourri of Cases,
9 AMER. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 229 (2001); Heather Lauren Hughes, Creditors' Imagined Communities and
the Unfettered Expansion of Secured Lending, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 425, 434 (2005) ("In the midst of this
debate [about the priority of secured credit], the 1999 revisions to Article 9 only expand the reach of full
priority secured credit.").
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, § 5, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248
[A]lI creditors coming in and proving their debts . . . shall be entitled to share in the
bankrupt's property and effect, pro rata, without any priority or preference whatsoever,
except ... [that] any person who shall have performed any labor as an operative in the
service of any bankrupt shall be entitled to receive the full amount of the wages due to
him for such labor, not exceeding twenty-five dollars ....
4 For some exceptions see BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE
MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (Clarendon Press
1998); Paul G. Kauper, Insolvency Statutes Preferring Wages Due Employees, 30 MICH. L. REv. 504, 507-
08 (1931) (citing five reasons for wage priority statutes: wage-earner dependency, inequality in bargaining
power, limited investigatory ability, limited financial resources, and workers' "interest" in product
produced); Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor: Worker Priorities in Bankruptcy, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 905, 926
(1993) (addressing priority issues of employee wages in employer's bankruptcy).
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will also note the policies surrounding the wage priority articulated by the courts as
they considered cases at its edge.
Part II will turn to the Supreme Court's most recent foray into statutory
priorities, Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.5 The Court in
Howard Delivery concluded that the statutory priority afforded to employee benefits
did not extend to unpaid premiums for workers' compensation insurance. 6 The
Court's specific holding doesn't tell the entire story. During the course of its
analysis the majority cited several long-standing bankruptcy policies in support of
its conclusion. Yet the Court passed over without mention one other policy that had
informed its analysis in two decisions under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act:7 protection
of wage earners and their families.
Thus, in Part III I consider three perspectives on the justification of the wage
priority. Market failure contrasting with rational autonomy are the first two. The
third perspective-the normative--considers the morality of a wage priority. This
Part also examines the religious, cultural, and political matrix of the 1841 Act,
focusing on ante-bellum American evangelicals and the rising Whig party. I will
argue that religious and political confluences on public morality played a significant
role in the creation of the wage priority. Reference to America's religious history is
not a mere add-on. Rather, such a perspective can inform an originalist vision of
statutory interpretation and provide significant clues for those who are guided by
the text.8
I. HISTORY OF THE WAGE PRIORITY IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Early Years-The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (with Glances at the Acts of 1800
and 1867)
The short-lived9 Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was a creditor remedy to deal with
absconding or otherwise recalcitrant merchants. 1° Interestingly, however, this first
stab at bankruptcy legislation effected a prospective elimination of priority in
' 126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 121-132 for a discussion of Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(4) (wage
priority statute) and section 507(a)(5) (employee benefit priority provision).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 135-138.
8 The utility to a purposeful approach to statutory interpretation goes without saying, at least for those who
share the purpose of assisting families to survive in the individualistic marketplace.
9 Passed by the House on April 4, 1800; repealed by the House on December 19, 1803. See Richard E.
Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification for Bankruptcy
Discharge, 62 ALB. L. REV. 467, 473 (1998) (stating Bankruptcy Act of 1800 Act was repealed in 1803);
John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy "Reform:" The 21st Century's Debtors' Prison, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 479 (2004) (noting brief duration of 1800 Act).
10 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 5, 6-12 (1995) (describing English antecedents, occasion for enactment, and reasons for short life of
the 1800 Act). See generally BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 8-10 (2002) (discussing incidents of
debtor-creditor relationship in Colonial and early post-colonial America); Coulson, supra note 9, at 473
(asserting Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was for creditors seeking remedy from bankers and merchants).
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distribution for liens (consensual, statutory, or judicial)," although liens existing as
of the date of the Act were not affected.' 2 The 1800 Act provided only one
priority-for administrative expenses of the assignee chosen by the creditors 3 _
after which net proceeds were to be paid to secured and unsecured creditors pro
rata. 1
4
"See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, supra note 3, § 31
[I]n the distribution of the bankrupt's effect, there shall be paid to every of the creditors
a portion-rate, according to the amount of their respective debts, so that every creditor
having security for his debt by judgment, statute, recognizance, or specialty, or having
an attachment under any of the laws of the individual states, or of the United States, on
the estate of such bankrupt ... shall not be relieved upon any such judgment, statute,
recognizance, specialty, or attachment, for more than a rateable [sic] part of his debt,
with the other creditors of the bankrupt.
Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. 289, 301 (1809) ("By the bankrupt law of the United States, their [the attaching
creditors'] priority, as to the funds of the bankrupt, is lost. They can only claim a dividend with other
creditors."); Harmon v. Jamesson, 11 F. Cas. 555 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 6079) (avoiding attachment lien and
requiring payment of attached funds assignees for distribution to creditors).
12 See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, supra note 9, § 63 ("[N]othing contained in this act, shall be taken, or
construed to invalidate, or impair any lien existing at the date of this act, upon the lands or chattels of any
person who may have become a bankrupt.").
13 See id.
[T]he said assignee or assignees [chosen by the creditors] shall be allowed and retain all
such sum and sums of money, as they shall have paid or expended in suing out and
prosecuting the commission, and all other just allowances on account of, or by reason
or means of their being assignee or assignees ....
14 id.
[T]he said commissioners shall order such part of the nett [sic] produce of the said
bankrupt's estate ... to be forthwith divided among such of the bankrupt's creditors as
have duly proved their debts ... in proportion to their several and respective debts ....
Notwithstanding the initial emphasis of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 on equality of all creditors, section 62
provided for one set of priority claimants whose identity should come as no surprise:
[N]othing contained in this law shall, in any manner, effect the right or preference to
prior satisfaction of debts due to the United States as secured or provided by any law
heretofore passed, nor shall be construed to lessen or impair any right to, or security
for, money due to the United States or to any of them.
Section 62 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was almost certainly intended to preserve the federal priority
statute enacted only three years earlier by the Fourth Congress, which provided the United States
government "shall be paid first" for all obligations to the federal government. See Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch.
20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515 (1797) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (2000)); Harrison, 9 U.S. at 299-300
(holding section 62 of Bankruptcy Act of 1800 specifically preserved fights contained in federal priority
statute).
[Vol. 16:121
2008] THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE
After the repeal of the 1800 Act, Congress left its bankruptcy power unused
until another business depression beginning in 1837.15 The Bankruptcy Act of 1841
more closely resembles current bankruptcy law than the 1800 Act.'
Relief under the 1841 Act was explicitly voluntary 7 and with certain
exceptions was available to all residents (not merely merchants) of the United States
and its territories.' 8 The 1841 Act expressly preserved liens and security that were
otherwise valid under state law. 9 Pro rata distributions were the norm,20 but there
15 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 16 ("[T]he devastating Panic of 1837, coupled with the victory of the Whigs
over the Democrats in the 1840 election, turned the tide. In a very close vote, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841
was passed."); see also Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a
Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L. J. 153, 159
(2004) (noting Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was "in response to the panic of 1837"); Ann Haberfelde, Note, A
Reexamination of the Non-Dischargeability of Criminal Restitutive Obligations in Chapter 13 Bankruptcies,
43 HASTINGS L. J. 1517, 1526 n.55 (1992) (referencing "panic of 1837" as "main reason" for enactment of
Bankruptcy Act of 1841).
16 See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935) ("It was the great Panic
of 1837 and the depression of the succeeding years that revived the pressure for a bankrupt law ...."); Tabb,
supra note 10, at 18 ("The 1841 Act, with its marriage of the concepts of 'bankruptcy' and 'insolvency,' could
be called the first modern bankruptcy law."). See generally Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 5 (advocating
preferential distribution of estate).
17 See MANN, supra note 10, at 228-39 (documenting cooperative use of Bankruptcy Act of 1800 to
achieve voluntary bankruptcy); John C. McCoid, 11, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEV. J.
361, 361-62 (1988) (discussing origins of voluntary petition in bankruptcy).
18 See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, § 1, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614
All persons whatsoever, residing in any State, District or Territory of the United States,
owing debts, which shall not have been created in consequence of a defalcation as a
public officer; or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any
other fiduciary capacity, who shall ... apply to the proper court ... shall be deemed
bankrupts within the purview of this act ....
The same section went on to reinstate the ability of creditors to seek involuntary bankruptcy with respect to
merchants and other persons engaging in business. See id.; see also Karen Gross et al., Ladies in Red:
Learning From America's First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 10 (1996) ("[T]he Bankruptcy
Act of 1841 permitted both voluntary and involuntary filings, and debtors were not limited to merchants and
traders."); John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy "Reform": The 21st Century's Debtor's Prison,
12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 479 (2004) (noting precedence of 1841 Act in permitting both voluntary
and involuntary bankruptcies).
19 See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, supra note 18, § 2 ("[N]othing in this act contained shall be construed to
annul, destroy, or impair ... any liens, mortgages, or other securities on property, real or personal, which
may be valid by the laws of the States respectively ... .
See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, supra note 18, § 5: ("[A]II creditors coming in and proving their debts ...
shall be entitled to share in the bankrupt's property and effects, pro rata, without any priority or preference
whatsoever ...."). The failure of the 1841 Act to make specific provision for priority distributions to
secured creditors does not mean that Twenty-Seventh Congress, dominated by Whigs, opposed commercial
interests. Instead, the District or Circuit Courts under the 1841 Act had plenary (and non-appealable)
jurisdiction to decide the rights of secured creditors by applying state law. See, e.g., Waller's Lessee v. Best,
44 U.S. 111, 120 (1845) (holding state law governed timing of creation of execution liens); Ex parte Christy,
44 U.S. 292, 319 (1845) (holding delays accompanying piecemeal consideration of secured claims in
multiple state courts could be "avoided[,] by bringing the whole matters in controversy between all the
mortgagees before the District Court of Circuit Court, making them all parties to the summary proceedings
in equity, and thus enabling the court to marshal the rights, and priorities, and claims, of all the parties ...
."); see also Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking In a
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were now three categories of priority among creditors: debts to the United States,
debts to sureties of federal obligations, and wages due to "operatives"
(employees).21
Insertion of a priority for unpaid wages reflected the effects of increasing
industrialization. In his ground-breaking book THE MARKET REVOLUTION, Charles
Sellers begins a narrative with America's Colonial society comprised of self-
contained, rural, agrarian communities and urban artisans.22 Domesticity and
community solidarity characterized this Jeffersonian idyll. Viewed in prospect,
neither bankruptcy nor a wage priority were necessary. Credit would hardly exist
outside the small class of merchants. 23 And, given a pre-industrial economy, most
employees would have been apprentices or farm hands from the community whose
interests would be protected by close personal relationships. Beginning in the
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6 (2006) ("The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 provided that district
courts' jurisdiction in bankruptcy was 'to be exercised summarily, in the nature of summary proceedings in
equity."').
21 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, supra note 18, section 5 continues to read as follows:
[E]xcept only for debts due by such bankruptcy to the United States, and for all debts
due by him to persons who, by the laws of the United States, have a preference, in
consequence of having paid moneys as his sureties, which shall be first paid out of the
assets; and any person who shall have performed any labor as an operative in the
service of any bankrupt shall be entitled to receive the full amount of the wages due to
him for such labor, not exceeding twenty-five dollars ....
Congress may have intended the bankruptcy priority for the United States to capture any obligations or
assets to which the general federal priority statute didn't attach. See supra note 14. Or maybe Congress was
simply erring on the side of assurance of payment. Priority for sureties of federal obligations should
probably be seen as a tool of stimulating international trade and enhancing collection of customs duties. See
Richard H.W. Maloy, The "Priority Statute"--The United States' "Ace-in-the-Hole," 39 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1205, 1209 (2006) (highlighting role of priority statute in 17th century American commerce); Barbara
K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for
Tax Claims, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 463 (2000) ("[lbn 1789, at a time when the revenues of the United
States derived primarily from customs duties and whiskey taxes, one of Congress's first legislative acts was
to grant the new federal government the right to be paid first when a person indebted to the United States
became insolvent.").
22 See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA,
1815-1848 5 (2007) (interpreting early nineteenth-century America under rubric of "communications
revolution"); see CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846, at 3-
33 (1991). Others have characterized this period differently. Yet Sellers and Howe agree that this was a
revolutionary period in American history, and Howe certainly credits the fact of the enormous growth of the
market economy. See HOWE, supra at 542. They disagree only on this period's leading characteristic. For my
purposes, the perspective of the market revolution is the more useful for analyzing the history and policy of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.
23 See Craig T. Friend, Merchants and Markethouses: Reflections on Moral Economy in Early Kentucky,
17 J. EARLY REPUB. 553, 558 (1997) ("In premarket moral economies like those of colonial America, the
local merchant acted as an economic patriarch over a 'household' whose members became bound to the
business through networks of credit and barter."); Gregory Nobles, The Rise of Merchants in Rural Market
Towns: A Case Study of Eighteenth-Century Northampton, Massachusetts, 24 J. SOC. HIST. 5, 5 (1990)
(portraying merchants as catalysts of social transformation in 17th century rural New England by connecting
consumers with credit ). But see MANN, supra note 10, at 131-32 (discussing effects of massive agricultural
indebtedness of Virginia Tidewater plantation owners).
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second decade of the nineteenth century, however, Sellers describes a new market
economy driven by "mobility, efficiency, individual self-exertion, specialization,
productivity, expanding consumption, and a way of life that disrupted communities,
uprooted relationships, and commodified family connections. ''24 Thus, "[t]he
practical issue that faced most American workers [in ante-bellum America] was not
the acceptance or rejection of wage labor but acceptance on what terms and with
what qualifications.
25
The 1841 Act both capped the amount of the wage priority at twenty-five
dollars 26 and limited the period immediately prior to bankruptcy for which the
unpaid employee could assert it to six months.27 The few reported decisions under
the 1841 Act dealing with wage priority construed "operative" broadly,28 but denied
24 MARK A. NOLL, GOD AND MAMMON: PROTESTANTS, MONEY, AND THE MARKET, 1790-1860 3, 16
(Mark A. Noll ed., Oxford University Press 2002).
25 R. LAURENCE MOORE, SELLING GOD: AMERICAN RELIGION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF CULTURE 76
(1994).
26 See S. Morgan Friedman, The Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.cominflation/ (last visited
February 14, 2008). There are several means by which to estimate the current worth of twenty-five dollars in
1841. A straight inflation formula equates $25 in 1840 to $481 in 2007. Insert $25 in "amount" and "1840"
as the year to see how much $25 in 1840 would equate to in 2007.
27 See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, supra note 18, at § 5 ("Provided, that such labor shall have been performed
within six months next before the bankruptcy of his employer .... The six-month look-back is the same as
under the current Bankruptcy Code) (emphasis added); II U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Code §1 ("(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order... (4) Fourth, allowed
unsecured claims, but only to the extent of $10,950 for each individual or corporation, as the case may be,
earned within 180 days before the date of the filing of the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's
business, whichever occurs first .... "); see also Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor.- Worker Priorities in
Bankruptcy, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 912 (1993) ("[The] 180-day period under § 507(a)(4) will be measured
by the debtor's bankruptcy filing. However, the language of [this] provisions is clear that if the debtor ceases
doing business prior to filing bankruptcy, the relevant priority period will be measured from the point
immediately preceding the cessation of business.").
28 See Ex parte Steiner, 22 F. Cas. 1234 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (holding claim of apprentice against master
for extra pay for extra work qualified as priority claim of "operative" notwithstanding possible
unenforceability of claim under state law). A year later the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
considered a virtually identical provision affording priority to "operatives" under Massachusetts law and
wrote:
We are not aware, that this clause has received any judicial construction, and the word
"operative," without more qualification than this clause contains, is not definite enough
to enable us to lay down any precise general rule. Probably the primary thought, which
legislators had in mind, was the wages due to men and women working in
manufactories, who usually receive their pay weekly or monthly. But certainly, it is not
limited to those working for manufacturers, or mechanics, or to persons working in
factories or workshops. Whether it shall extend to farm-laborers, to house servants, to
persons working singly or in gangs, in woods, or on marshes, or under contractors on
public works, at a distance from the home both of the employer and the laborer, are all
open questions ....
See Thayer v. Mann, 56 Mass. 371, 373 (Mass. 1848); see also Ex parte Rockett (In re Taylor), 20 F. Cas.
1070 (D. Mass. 1876) ("'[Tihat any person who shall have performed any labor as an operative in the service
of the insolvent' . . . I think it comes fairly within the true meaning of the statute, reasonably and liberally
construed, and that without departing in the least from the ordinary meaning of the words employed."
(quoting Thayer, 56 Mass. at 373)).
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that one could be subrogated to wage priority status.29 Although no federal case
analyzed the policy of the wage priority under the 1841 Act, a Massachusetts court
held with respect to that state's wage priority statute that "[w]e think the policy of
the statue was to secure to a class of very needy and efficient laborers, who are very
dependent and meritorious but who have little means of knowing the credit of their
employers, the small amount due them for very recent service.'30 The wage priority
reflected an increasing consciousness of the situation in which the growing class of
wage earners found themselves. Recognition of the changing nature of employment
in the new market economy as well a morally-grounded sense of paternalism were
at work.
The 1841 Bankruptcy Act was of even shorter duration than its 1800
predecessor-thirteen months compared to forty-four months. It too was repealed
with better economic times 3' and the bankruptcy clause lay dormant until 1867. But
"[a]fter the Panic of 1857 and the financial cataclysm caused by the American Civil
War, overwhelming pressure for another federal bankruptcy law led to the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.32
The 1867 Act opened the door to all residents of the United States 33 and
represented another step of detailed specification toward the current Bankruptcy
Code. The validity of security was expressly acknowledged.34 The same section
29 See In re Paulson, 19 F. Cas. 4, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 10,849) (holding claim of one who had lent
bankrupt money for payment of operatives was not entitled to priority under section 5 of the 1841
Bankruptcy Act); see also In re Pac. Oil & Meal Co., 24 F. Supp. 767, 771 (S.D. Cal. 1938) (emphasizing
that "any right to priority in bankruptcy should be clearly authorized by the [Bankrutpcyl Act and
established by the evidence ... This process ought not to be extended beyond the clear requirements of the
controlling statutes"). See generally In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (discussing Congress'
special protection of class of wage earners and distinguishing between salary and wages).
30 Thayer, 56 Mass. at 374.
31 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 18 ("With immediate goal of relieving the plight of the mass of insolvent
debts accomplished, and with little continuing political capital to be gained from the law, the 1841 act was
repealed in early 1843 after little more than a year of operation."); see also Richard E. Coulson, Substantial
Abuse of Bankruptcy Code Section 707(B): An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Need, 52 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 261. 263 (1998) ("The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was passed August 19, 1841 but did not become
effective until February 1, 1842. It lasted a little more than one year before being repealed on March 1843.");
Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the
Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 546-547 (199 1)
[T]he statute's use of federal exemptions without any homestead protection rekindled
fear in the agricultural states regarding the potential loss of land by debtors. On the
other hand, the statute's seemingly overall pro-debtor bent . . . led to creditor
dissatisfaction. Creditors asserted that the 1841 Act was not a bankruptcy statute but
merely an insolvency statute, and, thus, its enactment was beyond the power of
Congress. It was repealed soon thereafter by the same Congress that enacted it.
32 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 19.
33 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, § 11 (repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20
Stat. 99) (allowing "any person residing within the jurisdiction of the United States," with debts in excess of
three hundred dollars, to file bankruptcy petition).
34 See id., at § 20.
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also for the first time authorized the assignee to sell encumbered property for the
benefit of creditors,35 who were to enjoy an equality of distribution as of first
importance.36 The 1867 Act clarified the distribution rights of secured creditors by
expressly allowing them to share in dividends for the difference between the value
of the collateral and the debt.37
Administrative expenses and, for the first time, compensation of the assignee
had first priority in distribution.38 Section 27 of the 1867 Act provided that all
unsecured claims were to be paid pro rata with the exception of employees whose
priority was increased to fifty dollars.39 The next section of the Act, however,
provided for five levels of priority:
When a creditor has a mortgage or pledge of real or personal property of the bankrupt,
or a lien thereon for securing the payment of a debt owing to him from the bankrupt, he
shall be admitted as a creditor only for the balance of the debt after deducting the value
of such property ....
In re McConnell, 15 F. Cas. 1297, 1298 (C.C.D.N.J. 1874) (No. 8,712) ("[l~t is undoubtedly the duty of the
court to recognize and enforce any lien which [the creditor] may have by virtue of state law."); see also
Bavely v. U.S Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168, 1175 (6th Cir.
1990) (stating certain secured interests were protected under Bankruptcy Act of 1867); cf In re Henry, 266
B.R. 457, 474 n.18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting Bankruptcy Act of 1867 disallowed certain claims for
secured debts).
35 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, supra note 33, § 14 ("The assignee shall have the authority, under the
order and direction of the court.., to sell the same [encumbered property] subject to such mortgage, lien or
other encumbrances."); Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 25 (1878) (explaining that Bankruptcy Act of 1867
conferred on assignee power to sell property, subject to encumbrances); Yeatman v. New Orleans Sav. Inst.,
95 U.S. 764, 767 (1877) (explaining under Bankruptcy Act of 1867, section 14, "[a]mong the rights which
vest at once in the assignee by virtue of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and of his appointment as such
assignee, is the right to redeem the property or estate of the bankrupt").
36 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, supra note 33, § 14; Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 346 (1874)
("It is obviously one of the purposes of the Bankrupt law, that there should be a speedy disposition of the
bankrupt's assets .. . [t]his is only second in importance to securing equality of distribution."); McCan v.
Conery, 12 F. 315, 319 (C.C.E.D. La. 1882) (applying Bailey's purpose of Bankruptcy Act of 1867 to
statutes of limitation and deadlines).
37 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, supra note 33, § 20; In re McConnell, 15 F. Cas. at 1298 (holding
unsecured creditors get dividend only after landlord who enjoyed statutory lien under state law was
paid). Of course, the right of secured creditors to realize on their collateral and share in the estate for
any shortfall would have been recognized under the 1800 Act. See Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 289, 302 (1809) (stating law could not affect preference rights of secured creditor); Ex
parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 319 (1845) (holding creditors secured by mortgage have
foreclosure right against collateral property).
38 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, supra note 33, § 17 ("[T]he assignee shall ... be allowed, and may retain
out of money in his hands, all the necessary disbursements made by him in the discharge of his duty, and a
reasonable compensation for his services, in the discretion of the court."); In re Noyes, 18 F. Cas. 465, 466
(C.C.D. Mich. 1872) (No. 10,371) (interpreting language of section seventeen to require assignee apply to
court for administrative expenses); In re Dean, 7 F. Cas. 286, 291 (C.C.D. Ky. 1868) (No. 3,699)
[I]t is too plain for discussion, that this provision [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867]
means, that the assignee is to be allowed both his disbursements, and, at all events, a
reasonable compensation for his services in all cases, and that he may retain the sum
allowed out of money in his hands, if he has any.
39 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, supra note 33, § 27
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1. Administrative expenses;
2. Debts, including taxes, due to the United States;
3. Debts, including taxes, due to the state in which the bankruptcy
case was pending;
4. Wage claims; and
5. Any other priority created by a law of the United States.40
[A]II creditors whose debts are duly proved and allowed shall be entitled to share in the
bankrupt's property and estate pro rata, without any priority or preference whatever
except that wages due from him to any operative, or clerk, or house servant, to an
amount not exceeding fifty dollars, for labor performed within six months next
preceding the adjudication of bankruptcy, shall be entitled to priority, and shall be first
paid in full ....
U.S. v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251, 259 (1873) (referring to Bankruptcy Act of 1867, and remarking
"preferences are forbidden in order that equal distribution may be effected"); In re Erwin, 8 F. Cas. 779, 780
(C.C.D. Ga. 1870) (No. 4,524) (holding section 27 affords no priority to judgment creditors).
40 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, supra note 33, § 28
[A] third meeting of creditors shall then be called by the court, and a final dividend
then declared . . . Preparatory to the final dividend, the assignee shall submit his
account to the court and file the same, and give notice to the creditors of such filing...
• The court shall thereupon order a dividend of the estate and effects, or of such part
thereof as it sees fit, among such of the creditors as have proved their claims, in
proportion to the respective amount of their said debts .... In the order for a dividend,
under this section, the following claims shall be entitled to priority or preference, and to
be first paid in full in the following order:
First. The fees, costs, and expenses of suits, and the several proceedings in
bankruptcy under this act, and for the custody of property, as herein
provided.
Second. All debts due to the United States, and all taxes and assessments
under the laws thereof.
Third. All debts due to the State in which the proceedings in bankruptcy are
pending, and all taxes and assessments made under the laws of such State.
Fourth. Wages due to any operative, clerk, or house servant, to an amount
not exceeding fifty dollars, for labor performed within six months next
preceding the first publication of the notice of proceedings in bankruptcy.
Fifth. All debts due to any persons who, by the laws of the United States, are
or may be entitled to a priority or preference, in like manner as if this act had
not been passed: Always provided, That nothing contained in this act shall
interfere with the assessment and collection of taxes by the authority of the
United States or any State.
The significance of the final proviso can be debated. The editors of the fourteenth edition of Colliers on
Bankruptcy suggest that it "apparently lifted such debts into a position prior even to costs of administration,
notwithstanding their otherwise expressly subordinate character." 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY, 64.01, at
2047 (James William Moore, et al. eds., 14th ed. 1967). Alternatively, it could simply be understood to
preserve lien rights and the ability of these units of civil government to collect from the debtor or the debtor's
property after bankruptcy. See ORLANDO F. BUMP, BUMP ON BANKRUPTCY 241-42 (10th ed. 1877).
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Regardless of the relationship between sections 27 and 28 of the 1867 Act,
unpaid wages continued to enjoy a limited but substantial priority. The wage
priority had, however, fallen one place and was now behind certain state claims
over which it would have enjoyed priority under the 1841 Act. Judicial
construction of section 28 was generous. A father claiming wages on behalf of his
minor son41 and a temporary accountant42 were both afforded priority. However, in
1878 the District Court drew the line: there would be no priority for an amount due
for services to be rendered under an employment contract, which the bankrupt had
breached when it went out of business.43 While the Register in bankruptcy had
relied on the family-protection policy of the law 44 to allow the employee a priority
for future wages he would have earned but for his employer's cessation of business,
the District Court disagreed. Relying on the plain meaning of section 28 ("for
wages due ... for labor performed . . . ."), the court concluded that the claimant
"has not performed labor, and he is not entitled to wages which are a compensation
for labor., 45 In any event, Congress repealed the 1867 Act in 1878 with little
46
opposition.
41 See In re Harthorn, 11 F. Cas. 705, 705 (D. Me. 1870) (No. 6,162) ("Ordered, that fifty dollars of the
claim proved by [bankrupt], for services of his minor son.., be allowed and paid as a preferred claim.").
42 See In re Taylor, 20 F. Cas. 1070, 1070 (D. Mass. 1876) (No. 11,977) (allowing priority for wages for
"work of a clerk.., who was only engaged for two weeks, and for [a] single occasion").
43 See In re Prevear, 19 F. Cas. 405, 406 (N.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 11,053).
4 See id. ("The statute manifestly contemplates making provision for laborers and their families whose
occupation suggests that they have but limited or moderate means, and whose daily, weekly, or monthly
wages are necessary for their support ....").
4 Id. A New York court added concern for the employee's family to the purposes of that state's employee
preference law. See People v. E. Remington & Sons, 45 Hun. 329, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1887) (Maule, J.,
concurring) ("[Statute] was designed to secure the prompt payment of the wages of persons who, as a class,
are dependent upon their earnings for the support of themselves and their families ...."); see also In re
Stryker, 53 N.E. 525, 526 (N.Y. 1899) (explaining that law "was not designed to give a preference to the
salaries and compensation due to officers and employees of a corporation occupying superior positions of
trust or profit"); In re New York Locomotive Works, 26 N.Y.S. 209, 212 (Gen. Term 1893) (discussing
People v. E. Remington & Sons and concern for families of wage earners).
46 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 21 ("By all accounts, the sentiment for repeal was overwhelming."); cf 28
Cong. Rec. 4612 (1896) (statement of Sen. Burton) ("[T]he crowning evil of the law of 1867 was the
enormous fee bill which the register in bankruptcy and the assignee in bankruptcy were enabled to tax up
against the estate of a bankrupt ...."); David A. Skeel, The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 330 (1999) (citing desire "to prevent some of the abuses of the 1867 Act" in making
1898 Act); Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy
Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 354 (1999) (highlighting "negative
experience with the . . . 1867 Act" as source of delay in passage of 1898 Act). High fees and expenses
contributed to the demise of the 1867 Act. See In re Woodard, 95 F. 955, 956 (E.D.N.C. 1899) ("One of the
purposes of the act of 1898 in establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy was to avoid what was the
principal cause of the repeal of the bankrupt act of 1867--excessive fees and great expense."); Skeel, supra
at 332 (suggesting "costs of administration had left a bad taste in lawmakers' mouths after the 1867 Act").
ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:121
B. The 1898 Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 so far has been the most lasting effort of Congress
to legislate in the field of bankruptcy.47 The 1898 Act continued to provide priority
for wage claims, but the relative priority changed several times. Initially, the
priorities of the 1898 Act followed the Act of 1867. Secured claims were
unaffected by the Act and secured creditors received their collateral, or its value,
before any unsecured creditors.48 Section 64a appeared to provide first priority for
taxes,49 but section 64b went on to provide for all priority claims, including taxes.
Wage claims appeared in section 64b as a fourth level priority to the extent of three
hundred dollars for "wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants" now earned only
50within three months of the adjudication of bankruptcy.
Judicial analysis of the scope of the priority tended toward the narrow with
some exceptions. Learned Hand noted that each member of the trilogy of the 1898
Act (workmen, clerks, and servants) expanded on their predecessors under the 1867
Act. Yet, earlier he had been unwilling to extend the priority to a manager of a
broker's branch office52 and fifteen years later he held that "it would be an abuse of
47 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, PUB.
L. NO. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682); cf Hon. Prudence Carter Beatty, Judging at the End of the Millennium,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 1999, at 28 ("When the U.S. Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, it was
intended to be a temporary measure. However, there has been a bankruptcy law in continuous effect ever
since."); Hon. Leif M. Clark & Douglas E. Deutsch, New Development: The Delaware Gap: Exposing New
Flaws in the Scheme of Bankruptcy Referrals, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 257, 261 (1997) ("[1]n 1898
Congress enacted a bankruptcy act which stood the test of time.").
48 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 47, § 67(d) ("Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in
contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded
according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be affected by this Act.")
(emphasis added); In re Proudfoot, 173 F. 733, 734 (C.C.N.D.W. Va. 1909) (clarifying "plain intent of the
bankrupt law" that secured creditors take priority over wages due to laborers). But see In re Tebo, 101 F.
419, 420-21 (D.W. Va. 1900) (holding priority wage claims must be paid ahead of liens).
49 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 47, § 64a ("The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes
legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district, or municipality in advance
of the payment of dividends to creditors .... ").
'o Id. at § 64b. See text of section 64b, providing for all priority claims, including taxes.
51 Learned Hand in In re Albert 0. Brown & Co. stated:
Act March 2, 1867 [ ...] provided that priority should not be given, 'except that wages
due from him (the bankrupt) to any operative or clerk or house servant' shall be
preferred. In the present act [...] the words are workman, clerk, or servant.' 'Workman'
is possible a wider phrase than 'operative,' and 'servant' is undoubtedly wider than
'house servant; but the section is obviously copied after the law of 1867.
See In re Albert 0. Brown & Co., 171 F. 281, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (holding manager was not a
"clerk" and therefore not entitled to wage priority).
52 See id.
It is quite clear that Olmsted is not a 'workman' for the bankrupt. Nor is he a 'servant,'
because the term does not include all instances of the formal relation of master and
servant [... I In the more limited sense, it is quite clear that Olmsted is not a 'servant.'
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terms" to allow a "chief designer" of radios to enjoy priority status.53 Similarly,
other courts jealously guarded the wage priority gate by denying priority status to
the president of a bankrupt corporation, 4 a general manager,55 a traveling
salesman, 56 and a commission agent;57 although part time clerks who also worked
for others enjoyed the priority. 58 Congress expanded the class of priority wage
claimants in 1906 by adding "traveling or city salesmen. ' 59 Still, courts continued to
53 In re Lawsam Electric Co., Inc., 300 F. 736, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
54 The majority in In re Carolina Cooperage Co. stated:
Slocumb was neither a workman, a clerk, nor a servant, in the sense in which these
limiting words are used. If congress had intended this provision to extend to presidents
of commercial corporations, it would have said so. Presidents of such corporations do
not generally act as workmen, clerks, or servants, but exercise authority over these
classes, occasionally arbitrary and oppressive, but always in a way to let them know the
president is not one of them.
96 F. 950, 952 (E.D.N.C. 1899).
55 The majority in In re Grubbs-Wiley Grocery Co. stated:
Ordinarily a workman is understood to be 'one who labors ... one who is employed in
labor.' Doubtless the statute has reference to a workman employed on some character of
work,-laboring for some person who sustains to him the relation of an employer or
master, for whom he works. So, also, the term 'servant' ordinarily means a person
employed by another to render personal services to the employer .... This claimant
was himself a stockholder ... and was one of the board of directors, and was its general
manager .... He was not a servant, as he had no master over him [... ] It is true, he
was, in a certain sense, working for the corporation, the legal entity; but.., he was the
representative of the corporate body.
96 F. 183, 184 (W.D. Mo. 1899). After explaining why the claimant should not enjoy priority status, the
District Court went on to affirm the decision of the referee to allow priority status for the reasonable value of
the claimant's services. See id. at 185.
56 See In re Scanlan, 97 F. 26, 27 (D. Ky. 1899) (using various dictionary definitions to determine meaning
of three statutory words). But see In re Flick, 105 F. 503, 505 (S.D. Ohio 1900) ("But I am inclined to the
opinion, and will so hold, that a salesman, properly speaking, will come within the term 'clerk,' and is
entitled to priority.").
57 See In re Mayer, 101 F. 227, 227 (E.D. Wis. 1900) ("[T]he commission service was merely an incidental
agency in procuring customers, with no obligation to serve, and the claim is not one entitled to priority...
."); see also In re Crawford Wollen Co., 218 F. 951, 954 (N.D. W. Va. 1915) ("[Algents selling on salary or
on commission were held to be outside the privileges of section 64b, cl. 4, of the Bankruptcy Act."); In re
Caldwell, 164 F. 515, 516 (E.D. Ark. 1908) (observing Congress specifically amended act to avoid strict
judicial construction holding salesmen not protected class).
58 See In re Baublatt, 156 F. 422, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1907) ("Exclusive employment by the bankrupt has never
been considered necessary to constitute the claimant a clerk .... ); see also In re H. 0. Roberts Co., 193 F.
294, 295 (D. Minn. 1912) ("If the labor performed by him is so performed under his employment as clerk,
and is not performed as a part of his duties as an officer, then he is entitled to priority for his wages as a
clerk."). But see In re L. W. Birmingham & Son Co., 1 F.2d 511, 511 (E.D. Tenn. 1924) (finding manager
who performed functions of clerk in connection with duties as treasurer could not claim priority).
59 Act of June 15, 1906, ch. 3333, 34 Stat. 267 (amending statute to include traveling or city salesmen).
See Crawford Wollen Co., 218 F. at 954 (noting 1906 Amendment of Bankruptcy Act section 64b, cl. 4,
expressly included traveling salesmen and agents selling on salary or commission); Caldwell, 164 F. at 516
("When Congress found that some of the courts, giving that provision of the act a strict construction, had
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treat the scope of the wage priority narrowly by excluding payments due for
60
managing an "outsourced" but in-house department of a manufacturing company,
a plant superintendent who performed extensive manual labor, a general manager
and shop superintendent,62 or a teacher.63 Even a surety who had advanced funds to
the bankrupt for payment of wages could not be subrogated to the wage-earners'
priority, 64 although a specific wage assignment did carry the wage-earner's
priority.65
held that a traveling salesman was not within the classes mentioned, it amended the act so as to avoid that
construction by adding the words 'traveling or city salesmen.") (citations omitted).
60 See In re Thomas Deutschle & Co., 182 F. 430, 434 (M.D. Pa. 1910) ("[T]he remuneration to which he
was entitled was not wages but an agreed price for articles produced, which the law does not undertake to
preferentially provide for."); see also In re Bonk, 270 F. 657, 659 (E.D. Mich. 1920) (denying priority claim
where claimant managed store based on contract with bankrupt and exercised discretion in performance of
duties); In re Quackenbush, 259 F. 599, 601 (D.N.J. 1919) (finding person under contractual agreement with
bankrupt to run stamp business is not salesman or servant within meaning of Bankruptcy Act).
61 See In re Continental Paint Co., 220 F. 189, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1915); see also Wright v. Chase Nat'l Bank
of City of New York, 92 F.2d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 1937) ("Services rendered or labor performed as incidental
to the duties of a manager in charge do not make one either a laborer or a traveling representative."); In re
Crown Point Brush Co., 200 F. 882, 886 (N.D.N.Y. 1912) (finding assistant general manager's duties
involving some physical activity and labor "did not necessarily constitute him a workman or servant").
62 See Blessing v. Blanchard (In re Pacific Motor Car Co.), 223 F. 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1915) ("We think the
word 'servant' should be held to mean a restricted class of subordinate helpers who work for wages .... ");
see also In re Pac. Oil & Meal Co., 24 F. Supp. 767, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1938) ("Congress certainly never
intended that wage claims of officers of a corporation--even minor officers-who are in any way
responsible for management or who assist in policy forming should be given priority over the claims of
general creditors."); In re Broudarge Bros. Novelty Yarn, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 891, 891 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) ("[I]t
has been held that a general manager of a store even though he at times sold goods and at times rendered
clerical services, was not entitled to priority.").
63 See In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570, 570-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (holding that a teacher is not a "workman,"
"clerk," "salesman," or "servant"); see also In re Lawsam Elec. Co., 300 F. 736, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("The
statute was intended to favor those who could not be expected to know anything of the credit of their
employer, but must accept a job as it comes, to whom the personal factor in employment is not a practicable
consideration."); In re Gay & Sturgis, 233 F. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1916) ("I doubt whether the earnings of a
professional man, employed primarily because of his learning and his ability to advise helpfully, are properly
described as 'wages'....").
64 See United Sur. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 179 F. 55, 58 (8th Cir. 1910) (characterizing transaction as
simple loan rather than purchase of claims from workers which would secure some equitable right against
principal debtor deserving priority). Compare In re Allen Carpet Shops, Inc., 27 B.R. 354, 358 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding bank cashing wage checks constituted overdraft or loan, not intentional assignment
of wage claims so not entitled to priority) with Wilson v. Brooks Supermarket, Inc. (In re Missionary Baptist
Found. of Amer.), 667 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the
judicial policy to allow priority to assigned wage claims was designed for the protection of the worker, who
is thereby enabled to liquidate his claim against the bankrupt more advantageously.").
65 See Shropshire, Woodliff & Co, v. Bush, 204 U.S. 186 (1907) (holding assigned wages had priority in
bankruptcy); see also Wilson v. Brooks Supermarket (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of America, Inc.),
667 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming principle set forth in Shropshire and indicating unless there
is clear legislative intent in Bankruptcy Code not to allow transferees to stand in shoes of transferors,
transferees' position does not change by transfer); Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 375, 377 n.5,
378 n.6 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding "where collective bargaining agreement provided only for payments by
employer to welfare fund, with no assignment or deduction of workmen's wages, welfare fund was not
entitled to wage claim priority against bankrupt employer").
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Under the 1898 Act courts again articulated a paternalistic rationale for the
wage priority. "All creditors are supposed to stand upon an equal footing before the
law .... 66 Nonetheless, courts frequently observed that "[t]he bankruptcy act,
while primarily intended to secure an equal distribution of the assets of the bankrupt
among his creditors, evinces a strong intent on the part of Congress to protect those
who are dependent on their daily earnings for their support .... Advancing this
paternalistic argument the Ninth Circuit recognized the precarious nature of
working class life when it remarked that "[piriority of payment was intended for the
benefit only of those who are dependent upon their wages, and who, having lost
their employment by the bankruptcy, would be in need of such protection.' 68 Even
the Supreme Court acknowledged this rationale in 1912 in Guaranty Title when it
held that the wage claims under the 1898 Act had priority over the contractual
obligations due to the United States.69 However, anticipating concerns for
nonadjusting creditors, which would be more specifically articulated forty years
later,7° the District Court articulated a different ground for the priority when it noted
that typical wage-earners cannot be "expected to know the credit standing of their
employer but must accept employment as it comes., 71
Thus, three factors animated the courts' application of section 64b (and, after
1938, section 64a): a strong emphasis on creditor equality coupled with the
assertion that typical employees could not effectively protect their interests, and
66In re Flick, 105 F. 503, 507 (S.D. Ohio 1900).
67 In re Caldwell, 164 F. 515, 516 (E.D. Ark. 1908).
68 Blessing v. Blanchard (In re Pacific Motor Car Co.), 223 F. 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1915).
69 See Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 32 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1912)
The policy which dictated it was beneficent and well might induce a postponement of
the claims, even of the sovereign, in favor of those who necessarily depended upon
their daily labor. And to give such claims priority could in no case seriously affect the
sovereign. To deny them priority would in all cases seriously affect the claimants.
70 Professors Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried seems to have introduced the term "nonadjusting
creditor" in their seminal work The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy. As they
later explained,
[a] 'nonadjusting' creditor is a creditor that, for one reason or another, cannot or does
not adjust the terms of its loan to reflect the effect on its loan of all the arrangements
the borrower enters into with other creditors, including the creation of security interests
which, under full priority, completely subordinate the nonadjusting creditors' claim in
bankruptcy.
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy:
Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1295-96 (1997). See Hanoch Dagan,
Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247,
277 (2004) (noting Bebchuk and Fried's observation "non-adjusting" creditors cannot or do not adjust terms
of loan to reflect effect of all arrangements borrower enters into with other creditors on loan); Alan
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 362 (1999) ("A non-adjusting creditor...
charge[s] the lower pro rata interest rate either because it is unsophisticated or because the cost of altering its
contracts deal by deal would be too high in relation to the gains.").
71 In re Inland Waterways, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D. Minn. 1947).
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thirdly, recognition that Congress had acted to protect several sets of employees
who were especially dependent upon wages for survival and whose necessity made
them particularly subject to the vagaries of the labor market.72 Section 64b (and
later section 64a) was narrowly construed from all three directions. Only those
closely hewing to the courts' cabined understanding of the enumerated categories
would enjoy a priority.73
As part of the continuing political legacy of the Depression, in 1938 Congress
again amended the 1898 Act with the Chandler Act.74 A restated section 64a now
contained all priorities and arrayed creditors among five classes:
1. Administrative expenses;
2. Wage claims;
3. Expenses of creditors who successfully blocked an
arrangement, plan, or discharge;
4. Taxes due to the United States or any state; and
5. Any other debts granted priority by a law of the United States
and rent claims entitled to priority under state law.75
72 See In re Flick, 105 F. 503, 507 (S.D. Ohio 1900) (recognizing importance of creditor equality);
Caldwell, 164 F. at 516 (noting Congress' intention to protect workers who are dependent on their daily
earnings for their support); In re Lawsam Electric Co., Inc., 300 F. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (refusing claim for
wages because claimant was not in disadvantaged position of workman or servant). As Learned Hand put it,
"[t]he statute was intended to favor those who could not be expected to know anything of the credit of their
employer, but must accept a job as it comes, to whom the personal factor in employment is not a practicable
consideration." Id. Class bias was also at work. According to Hand, a radio engineer "is not in the same
economic class as the workers [and] . . . would have been the first to resent the notion that he was a
workman or a servant." Id. Of course, the engineer had sought priority for his unpaid wages, which seems to
belie Hand's characterization of the claimant's putative class consciousness.
73 The continuing confusion over the level of tax claim priority led Congress to enact substantial
amendments in 1926 that clarified the priority of tax claims. However, the 1926 amendments went on to
subordinate wage claims to a new priority for the expenses of creditors who opposed confirmation of a
composition. But the amendments also increased the wage priority to six hundred dollars. See Act of May
27, 1926, 44 Stat. 662; see also Tabb, supra note 10, at 27 (noting attempts made to "ameliorate the
perceived extreme pro-debtor orientation of the 1989 Act"). See generally Ralph H. Colin, An Analysis of the
1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 789 (1926) (stating, in regard to 1926
amendments, that "new amendments should go a long way toward effectuating a conformity in the theory
and practice of our bankruptcy law" concerning discharge in bankruptcy).
74 See Chandler Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682); Tabb, supra note 10, at 28 ("After the Depression
came crashing down in 1929, Congress passed several pro-debtor amendments that facilitated rehabilitation
through bankruptcy. Severe restraints were laid upon the ability of creditors to collect, even upon their
collateral."); Tabb, supra note 10, at 29 ("The fury of bankruptcy legislation came to a head in 1938 with the
passage of the comprehensive Chandler Act .... The Chandler Act substantially revised virtually all of the
provisions of the 1898 Act."); Anupama Yerramalli, Note, Deciphering the Statutory Language of 11 U.S.C.
Section 1102(b)(3): Information Disclosure Requirements Imposed Upon Creditors' Committees, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361, 376 n.95 (2007) ("The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 remained in effect until it was
replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. However, the 1898 Act was largely amended in 1938 by
the Chandler Act.").
75 See Chandler Act, supra note 73.
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Unsurprisingly, given the political dynamics of the 1930s, holders of wage
claims were the clear beneficiaries of the 1938 amendments. Congress repositioned
the wage priority upward and slightly broadened the class of its beneficiaries,
clarifying that part-time and non-exclusive traveling salesmen also enjoyed
priority.76 Yet the apparent improvement of priority for wage claims was tempered
because three priorities of the preceding version of the statute were folded into an
enhanced category of administrative claims. 77 With their move to a second priority
position, unpaid wage earners enjoyed their highest priority ever. And for the first
time Congress subordinated all federal claims, including tax claims, to those of
wage earners.
The 1898 Act continued to undergo modifications until its repeal in 1978.78
None of these later amendments changed the high priority status of wage claims
afforded with the 1938 Chandler Act.79 Yet at all times under the 1898 Act, and
notwithstanding the continued permutation and expansion of its priority provisions,
the Court continued to assert that "the broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to
bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among creditors. ' 80
76 See 3A COLLIERS ON BANKRUPTCY 64.201 [2.2] (1967); Chasing the Lien Through 67b of the
Bankruptcy Act, 3 STAN. L. REV. 711, 718 n.30 (1951) ("Prior to the 1938 amendments, priority was given
in bankruptcy to debts entitled to priority under state law."); John C. McCoid, II, Statutory Liens in
Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269, 275-76 (1994) ("The 1938 legislation put caps on wage and rent liens
on7personal property not accompanied by possession.").
See COLLIERS, supra note 76; see also Judge John H. Squires & Susan M. Pistorius, The Evolution of
Bankruptcy Law in the Northern District of Illinois, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 27, 52 (1997) ("One of the most
important revisions was the addition of Chapter XIII for the purpose of providing a method by which a
wage-earner debtor could pay his creditors in full in installments or effect a composition by payment of a
percentage of his debts over a period of time."); Jack F. Williams, National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Tax Recommendations: Individual Debtors, Priorities, and Discharge, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 43 (1997)
(noting "there is a long-standing policy beginning with the 1938 Chandler Act amendments that has
subordinated tax liens to administrative expenses").
78 See Alan J. Feld, Note, The Limits of Bankruptcy Code Preemption: Debt Discharge and Voidable
Preference Reconsidered in Light of Sherwood Partners, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 1447, 1455 n.42 (2006)
("Though there were a number of amendments to the 1898 Act, major reforms in some areas were enacted
through the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 .... ); Phillip J. Giese, Note, Till v. SCS Credit Corp.: Can
You "Till" Me How to Cram This Down? The Supreme Court Addresses the Proper Approach to Calculating
Cram Down Interest Rates, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 133, 137 (2005) ("Although the 1898 Act enjoyed a long
tenure, it was amended several times-most notably by the Chandler Act of 1938."); Eric A. Posner, The
Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 61 (1997) ("Moreover,
Congress had amended the 1898 Act many times, and courts had interpreted the 1898 Act and its
amendments in an aggressive way, resulting in a law of bankruptcy that often bore little relation to the
statutory text."); Tabb, supra note 10, at 30 ("Over the next forty years, Congress amended the bankruptcy
laws dozens of times .... ).
79 See Act of July 30, 1956, ch. 784, Pub. L. No. 840 (1956) (widening definition of traveling salesmen in
1956); Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 270 (1966) (repealed 1978) (modifying extent of
priority of tax claims in 1966); see also McCoid, supra note 76, at 280 ("Though not similarly protected in
the fourth draft, wage claims given priority attained that advantage in the fifth and the final drafts.").
80 Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930). See Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445,
451 (1937) ("[Tlhe object of bankrupfcy laws is the equitable distribution of the debtor's assets amongst his
creditors ...."); Tabb, supra note 10, at 25 ("Much of the 1898 Act was directed not at debtor relief, but
rather at facilitating the equitable and efficient administration and distribution of the debtor's property to
creditors.").
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Employee benefits other than wages achieved substantial prominence after World
War 11.81 Thus it is not surprising that the question of whether the wage priority
extended to such benefits eventually came to the fore. The Supreme Court decided
two benefits priority cases under the 1898 Act. In United States v. Embassy Rest.,
Inc.82 a six-member majority held that mandatory employer contributions to a union
welfare fund required under a collective bargaining agreement did not qualify as
"wages ... due to workmen. '83 The majority concluded that the contributions were
neither wages nor were they due the employees. The contributions, even though
84
mandatory, were just that-contributions. Further, they were not due to
"workmen" because the contributions were to be paid to the trustees of the welfare
funds maintained by unions.85 Nor, the Court noted, were the contributions held in
separate accounts for the benefit of specific members.86
The majority also cited principal and pragmatic reasons for its decision. Citing
one of its earlier bankruptcy cases for the proposition that "[tlhe broad purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
estate,87 and a labor case for the axiom that exemptions are to be strictly
construed, 88 the Court noted that the wage priority pre-dated the existence of non-
81 See BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 328 (Clarendon Press 1998) ("In
the post-World War II period, employee compensation increasingly consisted of both wages and benefits.");
see also Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 73, 75 (John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk eds., 2000); C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA,
The Bankruptcy Code and State Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J.
65, 69-70 (2003) ("Congress wished to encourage growth of pension plans and to protect participants in an
beneficiaries of such plans when it enacted ERISA.").
82 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
83 Id. at 35.
84 See id. at 32-33 ("[I]t does not appear that the parties to the collective agreement considered these
welfare payments as wages. The contract here refers to them as 'contributions."'); see also Local 140 Sec.
Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1957) (explaining payments by employer to security fund created
only debtor creditor obligation between employer and third parties for something other than wages); In re
Int'l Automated Machs., 13 B.R. 119, 120-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (allowing employer contributions
only general priority status).
8 See Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 33 ("Embassy's obligation is to contribute sums to the trustee, not to its
workmen; it is enforceable only by the trustees who enjoy not only the sole title, but the exclusive
management of the funds."); see also In re Brassel, 135 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding
employee never had property interest in employer's contribution to fund since trustee's discretion in
administration of fund was "final and conclusive"); Local 140 Sec. Fund, 242 F.2d at 378-79 (Hincks, J.,
concurring) (concluding denial of priority claim is proper because "it is self-evident that the appellant-Fund
is not a workman").
86 See Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 32 ("[These contributions] are flat sums of $8 per month for each
workman. The amount is without relation to his hours, wages or productivity."); see also In re A & S Elec.
Corp., 379 F.2d 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding contributions did not have customary attributes of wages
because they were flat sums); Sulmeyer v. S. Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1962)
(finding contributions to holiday fund were "wages" because were based on percentage of employee's wages
and tax, social security and unemployment compensation were withheld).
87 See Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 31 (quoting Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930)).
88 See id. ("[TIf one claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute."
(quoting Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952))); see also In re Boston Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc., 265 B.R.
838, 851 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001) (noting "equality of distribution" principle calls for strict construction of
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wage employee benefits and that the "few and guarded amendments" subsequent to
1898 evidenced Congress' limited solicitude for employees. 89 Re-emphasizing the
employee-trustee distinction, the majority also expressed a new concern: that
permitting benefits contributions to share priority with employee wages would end
up "reducing his own recovery," 90 an anti-dilution argument. Finally, the Court
returned to the paternalistic principle of its 1912 Guarantee Title9l decision by
restating what it believed to be the fundamental policy of the wage priority: "the
purpose of Congress has constantly been to enable employees displaced by
bankruptcy to secure, with some promptness, the money directly due them in back
wages, and thus to alleviate in some degree the hardship that unemployment usually
brings to workers and their families. 9 2 Regardless of the pedantic logic of the
Court's reasoning, the unique dependence on wages for the masses in the labor
market and a heightened concern for the effects of unemployment on closely related
third parties clearly animated the majority's analysis.
Nine years later another six-member majority held that unpaid mandatory
contributions to an annuity plan that were credited to the accounts of specific
employees were not priority claims. In Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States93 the Court
extended the holding of Embassy Rest. to an obligation to an annuity payable upon
the employee's death, retirement, or disability.94  Although crediting the
contributions to an employee's individual account looked more "wage-like" than the
non-allocated welfare benefits addressed in Embassy Rest., the majority cited three
principal reasons for not relaxing its prior narrow construction. The Court first
reiterated the fundamental purpose for the wage priority it had identified in
Guarantee Title and Embassy Rest.: promptly to secure back pay to alleviate "the
hardship that unemployment usually brings to workers and their families. 9 5 The
majority reasoned that the annuity benefits were thus not wage-like because
"nothing was payable to employees except upon the occurrence of certain events. 9 6
Retirement benefits, even though negotiated as part of the employee's compensation
federal bankruptcy priority statute); In re Little, 216 B.R. 769, 770 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997) (explaining
sections of Bankruptcy Code giving one creditor priority over another must be strictly construed).
89 Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 32
This class of claim has been given a preferred position in the Bankruptcy Act for over
100 years, long before welfare funds played any part in labor negotiations. True, the
Congress has amended the Act, but such amendments have been few and guarded ones,
such as raising the ceiling on the amount permitted, shifting the relative priorities and
enlarging the class to salesmen, clerks, etc.
90 Id. at 34.
91 See supra text accompanying note 68.
92 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952).
9' 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
94 id. at 225-26 ("Contributions received by the trustees are credited to the account of the individual
employees but are 'payable to him . . .' upon death, retirement from the industry at age 60, permanent
disability, entry into the Armed Forces, or ceasing to be a participant under the plan.").
95 Id. at 226-227 (quoting Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 32 (1959)).
96 id.
20081
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package, were not wages because they were not currently available to the
employee. 97 The majority next returned to its pragmatic anti-dilution rationale:
If delinquent contributions to welfare and annuity funds providing
deferred benefits to employees were to have equal priority with
wages payable directly to employees, the maximum payable
immediately and directly to employees would be reduced whenever
the individual wage claims approached $600 or whenever the assets
of the estate would not permit all wage claims to be paid in full.
98
In dicta, the majority extended this reasoning to the protection of junior priority
creditors, particularly citing concern for fourth priority claims such as workers
compensation.99 Finally, the Court noted that Congress had reenacted section 64a of
the 1898 Act after Embassy Rest. without change, from which it inferred
Congressional acquiescence in its earlier decision. 1°° The Court's paternalistic
concern arising out of the dependence of most employees on quick payment of
wages to allow them to buy their daily bread constrained its interpretation of
"wages." Its pragmatic concern about the effects of broadening the wage priority on
both wage earners and those lower on the priority list solidified the Court's
conclusion that any change in the scope of the wage priority should come from
Congress.
C. The 1978 Code
Work on completely reworking the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 began with a Joint
Resolution in 1968,101 culminating with the creation the Commission of the
97 See Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. U.S., 391 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1968) ("[T]he employee could not
assign, pledge, or borrow against the contributions, or otherwise use them as his own. Quite obviously the
annuity fund was not intended to relieve the distress of temporary unemployment, whether arising from the
bankruptcy of the employer or for some other reason.").
98 Id. at 228-29.
99 See id. ("[I]ncreasing the amounts payable to second priority creditors would reduce the assets available
for distribution to lower priority claimants and general creditors, including wage claimants not entitled to
priority."). The Court specifically addressed the negative impact of expanding the wage priority on various
taxes in a footnote.
It is instructive that workmen's compensation claims were not provable in bankruptcy
until 1934, when they were given a seventh priority. In 1938 the priority for
compensation claims was abolished. Moreover, taxes and Social Security contributions
which are withheld from wages are entitled to a fourth priority as taxes rather than a
second priority as wages.
Id. at 229 n.7.
'oo Id. at 228. ("Although the section was completely re-enacted in 1967, § 64a (2), was left unchanged
despite the fact that in every Congress since Embassy Restaurant bills have been introduced to overrule or
modify the result reached in that case.").
101 See S.J. Res. 100, 90th Cong., § 2(a) (1968).
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Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970.102 Congress eventually enacted the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,'03 which created section 507(a)(3), the
Bankruptcy Code's version of the wage priority. Congressional action between
1978 and 2005 had little substantive effect on the wage priority. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 slightly broadened the scope of the priority to cover
commissions generated by certain independent contractors.'04 The 1994 Act also
increased the maximum amount eligible for the wage priority. 0 5 In 2005, however,
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, which moved what had been the seventh priority for alimony,
maintenance, and support to a new first priority for domestic support obligations. 10 6
This change had the effect of moving the wage priority down one place, but given
the infrequency of significant wage claims in individual bankruptcies, it should not
have substantial distributional effects.
II. HOWARD DELIVERY SERVICE V. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE
Howard Delivery Service (hereinafter "Howard") was an erstwhile West
Virginia-based interstate freight carrier that operated in a dozen states and
employed nearly 500 people. °7 Howard had contracted with Zurich to provide it
with workers' compensation insurance in ten of those states.' °8 By the time Howard
filed chapter 11 in January of 2002, it owed Zurich upwards of $400,000 in unpaid
workers' compensation insurance premiums.1°9 Zurich ultimately filed a proof of
claim for $410,215 that asserted priority under section 507(a)(4), for "contributions
to an employee benefit plan."" 0 Howard objected to Zurich's claim of priority status
and the Bankruptcy Court upheld the objection.' 1 The District Court affirmed. 112
Zurich then appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed, 2 to 1.11 3 Each of the
102 See Law of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
103 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
'04 See Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 207 (1994); In re Classic Auto Painting & Bodyworks, Inc., No. 93-40730,
1997 WL 33477610, at *1, n.] (Bankr. S.D. Ga. June 5, 1997) ("The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
amended Section 507(a)(3) to increase the allowed amount to $4,000 and permit claims by independent sales
representatives .... ); David G. Hicks, The October Surprise: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994- An
Analysis of Title 11-The Commercial Issues, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499, 509 (1996) ("[S]ection 207 does
nothing more nor less than increase the earned wages priority of Code section 507(a)(3) from $2,000.00 to
$4,000.00 and clarifies that this protection extends to certain independent sales representatives.").105 See Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 108(c) (1994).
106 See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(d)(7); see also GovTrack.us, S. 256 (109th): Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 109-256
(last visited February 15, 2008).
107 See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2006).
108 id.
109 Id.
"
0 Id. at 2110.
.. Id. at 2109-10.
112 Id. at 2010.
113 Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Serv., Inc.), 403 F.3d
228, 230 (4th Cir. 2005).
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judges wrote separately and the two who voted to reverse did not agree on a
rationale." 4 Only Judge Niemeyer in dissent anticipated the Court's construction
against expanding priorities in his substantial use of Joint Indus. Bd. and Embassy
Rest.'
5
The Fourth Circuit was not the first to consider the claim of priority for unpaid
workers' compensation premiums. Over a decade earlier the Ninth Circuit held that
workers' compensation insurance was an "employee benefit" plan." 6 The court
concluded that neither the statutory mandate of workers' compensation nor the fact
that workers' compensation was not a "wage substitute" could deny unpaid
insurance premiums their bankruptcy priority.7 The two decisions intervening
before the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Howard Delivery went the other way. The
Eighth' 18 and Tenth'' 9 Circuits agreed that the legislative history of section
507(a)(4) excluded workers' compensation from its scope. The latter circuits held
that only bargained-for benefits enjoyed priority.
For the third time when considering the priority of employee benefits the
Supreme Court split 6 to 3. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer joined.
20
Justices Souter and Alito joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in dissent.' 2' The
majority in Howard Delivery limited its analysis of the history of what had become
codified at section 507(a)(5)122 to the comments of the House 123 and Senate
114 Id. at 229. Judge King asserted that "[t]he language of the Statute is plain and unambiguous," and, by
consulting several dictionaries, concluded that Zurich's claim should enjoy priority status. Id. at 235, 237.
Judge Shedd disagreed with Judge King's first conclusion, holding that "the phrase as a whole [is]
ambiguous." Id. at 239. After consulting the legislative history and ERISA, held that Congress intended that
"the workers' compensation insurance plan at issue in this case qualif[y] as an 'employee benefit plan."' Id. at
239, 241. Judge Niemeyer in dissent agreed that the meaning of statutory phrase was plain but, after
consulting Supreme Court precedent, concluded that the statute does "not give priority to claims for unpaid
workers' compensation insurance premiums." Id. at 245.
115 Id. at 244-45 ("To read § 507(a)(4) as expansively as do the opinions of Judge King and Judge Shedd
not only disregards the explicit language of the statute, but such a reading also violates the underlying
ground rules for construing priorities under the Bankruptcy Code.").
116 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, Inc. (In re Plaid Pantries, Inc.), 10 F.3d 605, 607 (9th Cir.
1993).
17 Id. at 607.
118 See Employers Ins. of Wausau, Inc. v. Ramette (In re HLM Corp.), 62 F.3d 224, 226 (8th Cir. 1995);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006); In re Shearon, 10 B.R. 626, 627 (D. Neb. 1981) ("The fourth priority
covers all 'forms of employee compensation.., not in the form of wages."').
119 See State Ins. Fund v. S. Star Foods, Inc. (In re S. Star Foods, Inc.), 144 F.3d 712, 716 (10th Cir. 1998);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006).
120 Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2108 (2006).
121 Id. at 2117.
122 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (2006) (placing "unsecured claims for contributions to an
employee benefit plan" fifth in priority); As the Court noted:
At the time respondent Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) claimed priority
treatment for unpaid workers' compensation premiums, the relevant subsections were
numbered (a)(3) (wages) and (a)(4) (employee benefit plans). The Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 . . . altered the priority list so that
(a)(3) became (a)(4), and (a)(4) became (a)(5).
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Reports 24 about its two earlier cases, Joint Indus. Bd. and Embassy Rest. It was
thus "beyond genuine debate," according to Justice Ginsberg, that "the main office
of § 507(a)(5) is to capture portions of employee compensation for services
rendered not covered by § 507(a)(4)." And this "main office" did not extend to
unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums. In other words, only "fringe
benefits [that] generally complement, or 'substitute' for, hourly pay' 25 enjoy
priority status. And workers' compensation premiums did not fall into the wage
substitute or even wage compliment categories.
The majority buttressed its narrow reading of section 507(a)(5) from three
directions: first, the broader ERISA definition of employee benefits was
inapplicable to construction of the Bankruptcy Code, second, workers'
compensation is not a uniquely employee benefit, and the long-standing twin
policies of equality of distribution and third, the corresponding narrow construction
of priorities.' 6 At the outset of its opinion the majority explained that it refused to
read ERISA's definition of the almost identical expression ("employee welfare
benefit plan") into the "employee benefit plan" of the Bankruptcy Code because
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code authorized the Court to do so. 27 Since Congress
Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2109, n.I.
23 See Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111 (stating § 507(a)(5) was provided to include benefits at issue
in Embassy Rest. and Joint Industry and citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at. 187 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1978, pp. 5963, 6147-48, summarizing as "explaining that the amendment covers 'health
insurance programs, life insurance plans, pension funds, and all other forms of employee compensation that
[are] not in the form of wages"'); see also United States v. Embassy Rest., Inc., 358 U.S. 29, 33 (1959)
(holding employer contributions to union welfare fund were not "wages due to workmen" thus not entitled to
same priority status as wages); Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 228 (1968)
(determining employer unpaid contributions to annuity plan were not wages due to workmen, and stating it
was more appropriate for Congress to overrule interpretation of statutory wage priorities in Embassy Rest).
124See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (2006); Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111 ("Congress created a new
priority for [fringe] benefits, one step lower than the wage priority [under § 507(a)(4)] ... [allowing] the
provider of an employee benefit plan to recover unpaid premiums"); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 59
(1978) (explaining section 507(a)(5) created "new priority for consumer creditor-those who have deposited
money in connection with ... purchase of services ... that were not delivered or provided").
125 Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111.
126 Id. at 2112-13, 2116 (noting federal court question "whether ERISA is appropriately used to fill in
blanks in a Bankruptcy Code provision," recognizing workers' compensation provides both fixed payments
for employees' on-the-job injuries and protects employers from significant tort liability, and using "corollary
principle that provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed" in applying the Code); Nathanson
v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (determining, under Bankruptcy Act, "if one claimant is to be preferred
over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute"); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 507.01, at 507-
10 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006) ("Because priorities grant special rights to the holders of
priority claims, priorities under the Code are to be narrowly construed. A party must fit clearly within the
requirements of the priority statute to be accorded priority status.").
Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2107 ("'Here and there in the Bankruptcy Code Congress has included
specific directions that establish the significance for bankruptcy law of a term used elsewhere in the federal
statutes.' No such directions are contained in § 507(a)(5), and we have no warrant to write them into the
text." (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 219-220
(1996)) (citations omitted)).
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had cross-referenced a few Bankruptcy Code sections to other statutes, 128 the
majority inferred that the lack of a cross-reference to ERISA in section 507(a)(5)
disabled the Court from doing so of its own accord.
129
The majority next compared workers' compensation to the types of employee
benefits at issue in Joint Indus. Bd. and Embassy Rest. Unlike payments to union
welfare funds and retirement annuities that benefit employees with no concomitant
gain to employers, "[w]orkers' compensation regimes . . .provide something for
employees-they assure limited fixed payments for on-the-job injuries-and
something for employers-they remove the risk of large judgments and heavy cost
generated by tort litigation. ' 130 The six members of the majority also made much of
the nearly universally compulsory nature of workers' compensation insurance.13 1
While acknowledging that not all states mandate that employers purchase workers'
compensation insurance, the majority asserted that the largely compulsory nature of
workers' compensation distinguished commitments to employee benefit plans,
which benefit from bankruptcy priority, from run of the mill insurance obligations,
which do not. 132 Finally, the majority noted that granting priority status to an insurer
like Zurich would have the anomalous effect of preferring debts to a private
insurance carrier over general obligations such as taxes owing to a state. Without
committing themselves, the majority strongly suggested that debts owed by
employers to a state workers' compensation fund would enjoy only the standard
128 See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 219 (1996)
(noting some provisions in Bankruptcy Code deal with subjects identified outside Code or adopt definitions
from other statutes, such as "places where the Bankruptcy Code makes referential use of the Internal
Revenue Code"); City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 284, 288 (1941) (finding seller obligation
under New York City sales tax was consistent with "tax" entitled to priority payment under § 64 of
Bankruptcy Act); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (refusing to find cross reference
"penalty" under Internal Revenue Code determinative of debtor's status under Bankruptcy Act).
129 Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2113 (noting Congress did not include directions construing section
507(a)(5) terminology, therefore, Court may not write them into text.).
130 Id. Basic economics teaches that one party to commercial transaction would not benefit another without
something in return: "Providing health care to workers fosters a healthy and happy workforce, and a
contented workforce benefits employers." Id. at 2114, n.6. So the majority distinguished traditional
employee welfare payments from workers' compensation benefits by asserting they were of a different
"order:"
[T]he benefit employers gain from providing health and pension plans for their
employees is of a secondary order . . . .These benefits redound to the employer
reflexively, as a consequence of the benefit to the employee. Workers' compensation
insurance, by contrast, directly benefits insured employers by eliminating their tort
liability for workplace accidents.
Id.131 See id. at 2114 ("Further distancing workers' compensation arrangements from bargained-for or
voluntarily accorded fringe benefits, nearly all States, with limited exceptions, require employers to
participate in their workers' compensation systems.").
132Id. ("We simply count it [mandated participation in workers' compensation systems] a factor relevant to
our assessment that States overwhelmingly prescribe and regulate insurance coverage for on-the-job
accidents, while commonly leaving pension, health, and life insurance plans to private ordering.").
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eighth level priority for unsecured claims of governmental units, three levels below
the priority for obligations to employee benefit plans.
33
Only after canvassing the standard tools of statutory construction did the
majority cite two of the long-standing policies adduced to support its narrow
construction of priority provisions. "[W]e are guided in reaching our decision,"
according to the Justice Ginsburg, "by the equal distribution objective underlying
the Bankruptcy Code, and the corollary principle that provisions allowing
preferences must be tightly construed."' 34 As it had in Joint Indus. Bd., the majority
justified narrow construction of priorities out of a pragmatic concern for general
unsecured creditors. Every dollar that goes to higher priority creditors would
diminish the funds available for those of a lower priority. 35 And, as it had in both
Embassy Rest. and Joint Indus. Bd., the Court mentioned the anti-dilution argument
and expressed apprehension that expanding the scope of the priority would redound
to the detriment of employees whose direct section 507(a)(5) fringe benefits could
be reduced by the. indirect benefits of workers' compensation premiums. 1
36
The majority did not, however, mention the fundamental and longstanding
normative principle it had first stated in Guarantee Title and employed in both Joint
Indus. Bd. and Embassy Rest.: concern for prompt alleviation of the economic
distress suffered by workers and their families occasioned by employer
insolvency.137 The Court nowhere explained why this argument had lost its
cogency. Perhaps the presence of widespread and more generous unemployment
133 Id. at 2115 ("We venture only this observation: It is common for Congress to prefer Government
creditors over private creditors [citation omitted]; it would be anomalous, however, to advance Zurich's
claim to level (a)(5) while leaving state-fund creditors at level (a)(8).") (citing New Neighborhoods, Inc. v.
West Virginia Workers' Comp. Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1989)). The majority's opinion failed to note
that to hold otherwise would have been inconsistent with its decision in Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title
Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912). In Guarantee Title the Court had concluded that the priority granted
to wages over federal taxes under the 1 898 Act implicitly modified the long-standing Federal Priority Statute
of 1797. To grant a private creditor's claim for premiums that would otherwise have been paid to a state a
priority equal to wages would subvert the policy of the wage priority:
The policy which dictated it [the priority of wages over taxes in the 1898 Act] was
beneficent and might well induce a postponement of the claims, even of the sovereign,
in favor of those who necessarily depended upon their daily labor. And to give such
claims priority could in no case seriously affect the sovereign. To deny them priority
would in all cases seriously affect the claimants.
Guaranty Title, 224 U.S. at 160.
134 Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2116 (rejecting Zurich's argument that giving claim section 507(a)(5)
status would incentivize workers' compensation carriers to continue coverage of failing enterprise, thus
rehabilitating the business).
135 See id. at 2116: ("Every claim granted priority status reduces the funds available to general unsecured
creditors and may diminish the recovery of other claimants qualifying for equal or lesser priorities."); supra
text accompanying notes 97-98.
136 See Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2116 ("Opening the (a)(5) priority to workers' compensation
carriers could shrink the amount available to cover unpaid contributions to plans paradigmatically qualifying
as wage surrogates .... "); supra text accompanying notes 131-132.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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benefits lessened this concern. Or, perhaps observation of the glacial pace of many
corporate reorganizations undercut the connection between priority and timeliness
of relief. Or perhaps the shift from concern for family integrity to advocacy of
individual autonomy occasioned the elision of this principle from the Court's set of
important policies. 38 In any event, the majority concluded by reiterating the
equality principle and restating the argument it had made forty years earlier in Joint
Indus. Bd. that it was for Congress to specifically provide for deviations from those
policies.
Any doubt concerning the appropriate characterization [of unpaid
workers' compensation insurance premiums], we conclude, is best
resolved in accord with the Bankruptcy Code's equal distribution
aim. We therefore reject the expanded interpretation Zurich
invites. Unless and until Congress otherwise directs, we hold that
carriers' claims for unpaid workers' compensation premiums remain
outside the priority allowed by § 507(a)(5). 139
I. EFFICIENCY, AUTONOMY, OR JUSTICE?
A. Employees as Maladjusting Creditors
A number of bankruptcy scholars have argued that the impact of consensual
secured credit on priority should be limited where third parties do not have the
capacity to adjust their prices or credit terms. 140 Tort claimants are the archetypal
examples of non-adjusting creditors.' 4' And employees are frequently cited as
138 The Court's turn from a family-based understanding of privacy to one that that is characterized by
virtually untrammeled individual autonomy is chronicled in David M. Wagner, The Constitution and
Covenant Marriage Legislation: Rumors of a Constitutional Right to Divorce Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1999-2000) (anticipating "constitutional attacks on covenant
marriage legislation based on modem substantive due process"). See Larry Peterman & Tiffany Jones,
Defending Family Privacy, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72-73 (2003) ("[Family-based conception of privacy
has increasingly given way to the idea that privacy attaches to individuals regardless of their family role.");
John Tuskey, What's a Lower Court to Do? Limiting Lawrence v. Texas and the Right to Sexual Autonomy,
21 ToURo L. REV. 597 (2005-2006) (arguing Lawrence v. Texas holding is fact-sensitive and applies only to
the instant case).
139 Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (2006).
140 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REV. 311, 340 (1993) ("Ideally, nonconsensual creditors would have the highest priority in any sort
of firm."); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 902-3 (1982) ("[N]on-consensual claimants, such as tort creditors, pose special problems to
which application of a consensual model seems largely inapplicable."); Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On
the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 227 ("A rule of
priority for nonbargain creditors seems efficient.").
141 See supra text accompanying note 140; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain,
80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1908 (1994) ("[Sleveral scholars writing on the puzzle of secured debt have
acknowledged the plausibility of the arguments [that involuntary tort creditors should have priority over
secured creditors] .... ); Christopher M.E. Painter, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System:
Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1054-55 (1984) (discussing unfairness of
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another instance of non-adjusting creditors.1 42 But unlike tort victims, employees
voluntarily choose their employer and assent to the terms of the employment
relationship. Indeed, as Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook have recently noted,
in theory "[e]mployees can protect themselves from the risk of their employer's
insolvency by investigating the company's financial condition and either seeking
employment elsewhere or demanding higher wages to reflect the risk ...., They
quickly go on, however, to make the following three points in arguing for the
practical inability of employees to adjust their services in light of the financial
condition of their employers:
The substantial sophistication and the high transaction costs
required to obtain the necessary information present significant
barriers. Moreover, the costs of moving from one employer to
another can be quite onerous . . . . Similarly, although most
creditors have the option of spreading their risks by extending
credit to several customers, this option is not available to
employees, who are unlikely to work for more than a single
employer. 44
including "nonconsenting tort claimants in consent-oriented framework" of secured credit despite inability of
tort claimants to adjust claims).
142 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, supra note 70, at 885
We have just seen that involuntary creditors are not able to adjust the size of their
claims when a borrower creates a security interest in favor of another creditor because
their claims are fixed by law. But the fact that a creditor voluntarily contracts with a
firm does not necessarily make that creditor adjusting with respect to any security
interest created by the firm. Many of a firm's voluntary creditors are customers,
employees, and trade creditors that have relatively small claims against the firm. Even
though these creditors may sometimes, in principle, be able to take the existence of a
security interest into account in contracting with the firm, the small size of their claims
will generally make it irrational for them to do so.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317, 337 (1999)
(citing employees as non-adjusting creditors); Eldon H. Reiley, Security Interests in Personal
Property, 1 SEC. INTERESTS IN PERS. PROP. § 3:1 (Sept. 2007) (listing employees as non-adjusting
creditors).
143 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical
Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1232 (2005).
144 Id.
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Warren and Westbrook characterize employees as "maladjusting" creditors. 45
While they have the potential to adjust their prices or places of employment,
employees cannot effectively do so. Since 1887 the courts have acknowledged this
perspective when construing the wage priority. 146 Yet its cogency is questionable.
Why should the law protect employees who fail to adjust by moving from a
financially weak employer to one that appears more solvent? Or who fail to bargain
for security or an increase in compensation to account for the risk of nonpayment?
Doesn't the wage priority create a moral hazard?
Recognizing the weakness of Warren and Westbrook's analysis, Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried take a slightly different route to arrive at the same
destination. They do not argue that employees cannot adjust, but instead believe
that it would be irrational for them to do so: "Many of a firm's voluntary creditors
are . . . employees .. . . Even though these creditors can, in principle, take the
existence of a security interest into account in contracting with the firm, the small
size of their claims will generally make it rational for them not to do so."'14 7 Simply
put, the costs of calibrating the price of employment services to the potential value
of unencumbered assets in the event of bankruptcy outweigh the benefit. It is thus
irrational for individual employees to adjust. But Bebchuk and Fried do not address
whether the employment market as a whole has adjusted for the possibility of
nonpayment of wages when a firm enters bankruptcy. It may be the case that a
portion of market-driven wages includes an "insolvency premium" to insure against
the risk of nonpayment.
Because Warren and Westbrook believe that the labor market regularly falls
employees on its own terms, they conclude that non-market intervention is
necessary. The particular form of non-market intervention for their purposes is
retention of a "mandatory" Bankruptcy Code in lieu of various suggested
"contractual" insolvency alternatives that they describe in their article. 48 Thus,
145 Id. ("Employees in these circumstances might fairly be described as maladjusting creditors."). Warren
and Westbrook do not clearly define "these circumstances." Are the concerns they raise about the practical
ability of employees to adjust the price of their services (or take their services elsewhere) characteristic of all
employees or only a subset? Intuitively there would seem to be many individual employees who can and do
adjust prices in light of their employer's financial condition. See id. at 1239; 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2006)
(limiting administrative expense priority for certain severance payments to "key employees"). in fact, later in
their article Warren and Westbrook admit as much: "We recognize that some of the creditors identified in
these categories are only candidates for classification as maladjusting creditors; the information about them
is too sketchy to permit a confident evaluation of their prebankruptcy readjustment capacities." Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 143, at 1238. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (2006) (limiting administrative expense
priority for certain severance payments to "key employees").
'46 See People v. Remington & Sons, 10 N.Y.S. 310 (1887).
147 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 70, at 885. Bebchuk and Fried conclude alternatives to full priority for
secured credit should be examined with an eye toward protecting nonadjusting creditors like employees. See
id. at 905-909 (discussing fixed-fraction priority, adjustable-priority, and consensual-priority as means of
transferring value from secured to nonadjusting unsecured creditors).
148 See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 143, at 1204. Warren and Westbrook place contractualist
solutions to corporate insolvency into one of three categories: automated bankruptcy (where priorities are
built into a business's financial instruments), a menu system (where a prospective debtor chooses from
among a limited set of statutory insolvency options in its organizing documents), and an evergreen regime
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while Warren and Westbrook do not address specifically the wage priority in
section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code, we can reasonably assume that its presence is
one of the non-market factors that they believe should be retained in any bankruptcy
law. Bebchuk and Fried similarly do not address the wage priority. But one would
hardly seem justified given their conclusion about the irrationality of employee
evaluations of employer solvency. A wage priority would only reinforce the
decision not to adjust, again creating a moral hazard.
B. Employees as Autonomous Economic Actors
It is by no means clear that economic arguments will resolve the wisdom of the
wage priority provision. Perhaps wage earners can protect themselves through
pricing their services, changing employers, or simply by staying put even with
financially troubled firms if economically rational. Or, failing those alternatives,
maybe they are sufficiently protected by the market generally, and do not need
special priority protection in the Bankruptcy Code.
If only vindicating personal autonomy justifies coercive state action, Congress
had little warrant for creating a priority for wage earners. The limitations on
employee bargaining noted above hardly rise to the level of the incapacity typically
associated with governmental paternalism. Employees are neither mentally nor
physically disabled from acting rationally. Not all states offer employees a priority
claim upon the insolvency of their employers; why should the federal government
do so in bankruptcy? 4 9 Nor are there any legal impediments to bargaining for
security by employees. In fact, employees can have a strong bargaining position:
"where the employer is attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy, the employees will
almost always be crucial to the success of such an undertaking."'
' 50
A hands-off policy toward wage priorities is consistent with classical liberal
economic and political thought. And the Court's omission of reference to the needs
of the employee's family is certainly consistent with the individualistic bent of
autonomy-based theories of ethics.
(where the debtor and each creditor negotiate a contract for dealing with insolvency, the last of which is
controlling on all). See id.
149 See Paul G. Kauper, Insolvency Statues Preferring Wages Due Employees, 3O MICH. L. REV. 504, 504-
05 (1932) (discussing range of employee preference statutes during early years of Great Depression);
Keating, supra note 4, at 926 ("[W]hy should a worker whose claim against its employer outside of
bankruptcy is a general unsecured claim suddenly enjoy a preferred position merely by the happenstance of
its employer filing for bankruptcy?").
150 Keating, supra note 4, at 907. Keating ultimately concludes that "[p]erhaps the best solution to the
worker-priority issue is to eliminate the formal priorities and simply allow the workers to exercise what may
be their best leverage anyway: their ability as valuable employees to affect whether or not their employer
will prosper as a viable going-concern." Id. at 926. Some early New Jersey decisions remarked that the
leverage of employees on foundering employers justified the state law preference. See, e.g., Lehigh Coal &
Navigation Co. v. Cent. R.R., 29 N.J. Eq. 252 (N.J. Ch. 1878); Bedford v. Newark Mach. Co., 16 N.J. Eq.
117 (N.J. Ch. 1863).
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C. The Wage Priority as Justice
Assuming that economic theory is inconclusive for the wage priority, is there
anything else to support it? Do wage earners (and their families) deserve a priority
for any reason other than their putative inability to adjust to an employer's relative
solvency? What are we to make of the Court's obeisance to the principle of equality
of distribution in light of the growing number of bankruptcy priorities? To address
the wage priority from a normative point of view takes us back to its origins in the
1841 Act.
The 1841 Bankruptcy Act represents perhaps the earliest example of the
confluence of evangelical Christian moralism and a nationalist political party with
strong business ties. The direct ancestors of twenty-first century evangelicals came
into being in the early nineteenth century. As David Bebbington has observed,
evangelical Christianity was and is characterized by four distinctives: biblicism (a
particular regard for the Bible as the sole source for moral living and ethics);
crucicentrism (a focus on the atoning work of Christ on the cross over other aspects
of the biblical description of Christ's work); conversionism (the belief that
everyone, even professing Christians, need an experience of conversion, frequently
with an emphasis on emotional suasion); and activism (the belief that the Christian
Gospel needs to be expressed in serious efforts).,15 George Marsden describes ante-
bellum evangelicalism in similar terms with its emphasis on the free individual,
education, technique, "back to the Bible" for answers to life's questions, and social
reform. 152 Bebbington's and Marsden's final distinctives of evangelicalism-activism
and social reform-focusing on efforts by which the gospel was to be expressed,
included the individual and the community. Evangelicals looked to reform the lives
of individuals and the broader society in accord with their understanding of the
Bible's moral strictures. Leading among the social expectations of ante-bellum
evangelicals were temperance, 153 slavery, 154 and the rights of women. 55 But the
11 See D.W. BEBBINGTON, EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN BRITAIN: A HISTORY FROM THE 1730S TO THE
1980s 2-3 (1988). For a discussion of evangelical social reform in America see GEORGE M. MARSDEN,
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 112 (1990).
Americans from the dominant classes were intensely moralistic, with a strong sense of
civic responsibility. Civic responsibility and charity were, in fact, lessons that were
always taught alongside the work ethic and tempered its individualism.... So reform
in America often has a middle-class base, appealing to the Judeo-Christian principles
that each person has responsibilities for the welfare of all their neighbors.
BEBBINGTON, supra at 2-3.
152 MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 53-63.
153 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 543 ("The cause of temperance spread from its small-town religious
origins to the cities."); Alfred L. Brophy, Harriet Beecher Stowe's Critique of Slave Law in Uncle Tom's
Cabin, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 457, 461 (1995-96) (noting evangelical reform of laws ranged from domestic
relations to temperance); W.J. Rorabaugh, Note, Reexamining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 285, 288 (1996) (recognizing evangelical temperance movement began in 1820s and required
abstinence for godliness and respectability).
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issues arising from the ballooning market-driven debtor-creditor relationship did not
escape evangelicals' notice.
None of these four distinctives was unique to evangelical Christianity; however,
evangelicalism's reduction of the scope of Christianity to only these four is
significant. Two of these distinctives are particularly important for purposes of the
relationship of ante-bellum evangelicals to politics. The first was evangelicalism's
emphasis on social action. Many evangelicals were post-millennialists. 156 That is,
they believed that a reformation of the morality of American society would usher in
Christ's millennial kingdom. 157 Social progress was identified with the Kingdom of
God and spurred by the belief that such progress was a condition precedent to the
eschatological hope of the end of the present age and the arrival of the golden age to
come.15 8 The second implication of evangelicalism's reductionism was its implicit
154 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 476; Alfred L. Brophy, Harriet Beecher Stowe's Critique of Slave Law in
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 457,461 (1995-96)(mentioning evangelical religious leader, Calvin
Stowe, Harriet Beecher Stowe's husband, who developed comprehensive antislavery religious doctrine,
"which asserted that slavery is inconsistent with Christ's teaching, demanded that human-made laws
supporting slavery should be disobeyed, and claimed that slavery depressed the wages and quality of life of
free workers"); Mark A. Sargent, The Coherence and Importance of Pro-Life Progressivism, 2 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 384, 391 (2005) (recognizing anti-slavery movement was rooted in evangelical Christianity).
155 See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 22; SELLERS, supra note 22, at 54, 64 ("The reforms undertaken by the
evangelicals of the time were typically concerned with redeeming persons who were not functioning as free
moral agents: slaves, criminals, the insane, drunkards, children, and even-in the case of the most logically
rigorous of the reformers-women."). The end of slavery in America was also distinctive among many Whigs.
For an in-depth analysis of the intersection of evangelicals and the burgeoning market economy see NANCY
A. HEwrIT, WOMEN'S ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1984). For a discussion of evangelicals and
women's rights see NANCY A. HARDESTY, YOUR DAUGHTERS SHALL PROPHESY (1991).
156 See GEORGE M. THOMAS, REVIVALISM AND CULTURAL CHANGE: CHRISTIANITY, NATION BUILDING,
AND THE MARKET IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 75-77 (1989); WALLACE G. MILLS,
MILLENNIAL CHRISTIANITY, BRIT. IMPERIALISM, AND AFR. NATIONALISM 337, available at
http://huskyl.smu.ca/-wmills/course322/MillennialChristianity.pdf (mentioning postmillennialism became
dominant in Britain and North America in early nineteenth century); STEPHANIE STIDHAM ROGERS, AM.
PROTESTANT PILGRIMAGE: NINETEENTH-CENTURY IMPRESSIONS OF PALESTINE 60,63, available at
http://65.209.121.29/koinonia/assets/issues/15/stidmanrogers2%20--%20for%20web.pdf (explaining that
postmillennialism was most widely accepted Protestant idea by middle of nineteenth century).
157 See MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 61
Millennial imagery had important implications for Americans at home as well.
Americans regarded themselves, and were widely regarded, as "a city on the hill" for
the advancement of civilization. They combined classic republicanism, Protestant
dominance, and religious freedom into a belief that American civilization would be in
the forefront of an outpouring of the Holy Spirit that would usher in the last millennial
golden age of world civilization.
see also HOWE, supra note 22, at 469 ("The spread of literacy, discoveries in science and technology, even a
rising standard of living, could all be interpreted-and were-as evidences of the approach of Christ's Second
Coming and the messianic age foretold by the prophets, near at hand."); Diana Hochstedt Butler, The Church
and Am. Destiny: Evangelical Episcopalians and Voluntary Societies in Antebellum Am., 4 RELIGION AND
AM. CULTURE 193 (1994) (obeying God's laws would begin to usher in millennium in their new world).
158 See HOWE, supra note 22 at 6
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depreciation of the place of the church as an institution. The explosion of in the
number of American Christian denominations after the Founding era coupled with
the rise of revivalism inevitably weakened the relationship of an individual
Christian's relationship to a visible, institutional ecclesial body. With the reduction
of the typical evangelical's identity to his or her personal relationship to Jesus,
evangelicalism cut itself off from Christianity's historic form of collective social
action in the church. Biblical metaphors for the Church, which the early Puritans
had applied to their unique experiment in Massachusetts, were easily elided to the
United States as a whole through the early nineteenth century. 159 Christianity in
America had become comfortable with the market's appeal to individual subjective
value. 6° Without the Church as the locus of holy living, society as a whole became
the object of evangelicalism's activism. And what broader form of society was
there than the nation?
Historian Edward Balleisen develops evangelicalism's moral activism regarding
the debtor-creditor relationship in NAVIGATING FAILURE.' 6 1 Citing pamphleteers,
writers of short stories, other texts, and sermons, Balleisen paints a picture in which
both sides of the credit relationship bore moral responsibilities to the other and even
to third parties. For debtors, the "guiding lights for a failing American were 'a fair
American religion displayed remarkable originality. Millenarians warned of the
imminent Second Coming of Christ. The evangelical movement prompted national
soul-searching and arguments over the country's goals and the best means to achieve
them. Reformers motivated by religion challenged long-held practices relating to the
treatment of women, children, and convicts ....
WALLACE G. MILLS, MILLENNIAL CHRISTIANITY, BRIT. IMPERIALISM, AND AFR. NATIONALISM, 337,
available at http://huskyl.smu.ca/-wmills/course322/Millennial-Christianity.pdf ("The Kingdom of God
(the millennium) will be formed gradually through individual conversions and societal improvement.");
Richard J. Carwardine, Lincoln, Evangelical Religion, and Am. Political Culture in the Era of the Civil War,
18 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS'N 27, 30 (1997) (recognizing evangelicals stressed public responsibilities of
Christians would bring about glorious millennium).
159 See Louis Weeks, God's Judgment, Christ's Command: Use of the Bible in Nineteenth-Century
American Political Life, THE BIBLE IN AMERICAN LAW, POLITICS, AND POLITICAL RHETORIC 61, 62 (James
Turner Johnson ed., Scholars Press 1985) (1985)
Themes from the Bible, which had been applied to the church before being applied to
the nation, continued to be popular throughout the century: "a city set upon a hill," "a
light to the nations," "the servant of the Lord," "the chosen people," and "the mission of
the nation" all made their way as expressions in the political life of the United States,
still bearing biblical freight.
Daniel H. Levine, Religion and Politics in Comparative and Historical Perspective, 19 COMPARATIVE
POLITICS 95, 120 (Oct. 1986) (discussing how Puritan contractual notions evolved into democratic forms in
Catholicism today); Milette Shamir, "Our Jerusalem," 55.1 AM. Q. 29, 35 (2003) ("Americans were a people
because they were like the "Chosen People"; they were entitled to their land because it was like the Biblical
'Promised Land."').
160 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 25 (arguing market revolution used evangelicalism). For a discussion of
the relationship between social/economic change and religious movements in an earlier context see C. Scott
Pror, The Puritan Revolution and the Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 291 (2005).
6, EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 70 (Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press 2001).
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disclosure, a full surrender, and an equal distribution."' 162 Creditors were not
immune from evangelicals' moral strictures:
[T]he holders of claims against insolvents ought to respect the
rightful interests of other parties. Rather than seek an advantage
over his neighbor, the creditor of a bankrupt should deem his honor
of more value than even the preference of a large percentage of
pecuniary gain. Other prescriptions emphasized the duty of charity
toward those who had suffered misfortune.
63
Even the concept of property as "despotic dominion" became the object of critical
moral analysis. A purposeful understanding of property as a means of large-scale
social improvement moved the question of what could count as property into the
realm of theological discussion.164
The continuing moralization of all debt is significant. Bruce Mann has argued
in REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS that the waning years of the eighteenth century reflected
both a mindset of debt (particularly the failure to repay it) as sin as well as a
grudging but increasing recognition that debt was necessary for a commercial
society:
[T]he moral economy of debt had lost its religious underpinnings
by the end of the eighteenth century, at least for commercial debtor.
The redefinition of insolvency from moral failure to economic risk
did not eliminate debtors' legal obligations to repay their debts.
Rather, it secularized the foundations of the moral obligation to
repay . . . and changed the general understanding of how the law
should treat failure. 1
65
62 Id. (quoting an 1839 address of Philadelphia merchant John Sargeant).
163 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164 See Gamester v. Massey, 158 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1959) (defining "absolute" as
"completely, wholly; without qualification"); Thomas D. Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An
Empirical Look at the Role of Law In Slave Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18
CARDOzO L. REV. 473, 492 (1996) (stating master's power over his property must be absolute); Max L.
Stackhouse, Jesus and Economics: A Century of Reflection, in THE BIBLE IN AMERICAN LAW, POLITICS,
AND POLITICAL RHETORIC 115 (James Turner Johnson ed., Scholars Press 1985) (1985)
[T]he roots of the American reexamination of economic ethics are in the revivals of the
pre-Civil War period. The origins of "social Christianity" in its modern forms were
distinctly influenced by the new burst of evangelicalism. This [late Eighteenth-Century]
alliance [of Calvinism and the Enlightenment had] produced both new shapes of
democratic constitutional government and an interpretation of private property that was
nearly absolute. But in the ante-bellum revival movements, the absoluteness of property
was challenged ....
165 Mann, supra note 10, at 260. See Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business
Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 561 (1994) (asserting
sinful perception of not repaying debts); PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA:
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Mann over-stated the secularizing influences of the burgeoning market economy.
Notwithstanding an understanding of the commercial utility of debt that became
widespread after the Founding era, both efficiency and morality continued to
dominate the debates around the 1841 Act. Like the other moral causes of ante-
bellum America-temperance, abolition of slavery, and women's rights-
bankruptcy reformers cast their rhetoric in explicitly ethical terms. 166 Policy-makers
of the early nineteenth century did not observe the contemporary
compartmentalization of utility and morality. Distinct arguments stressing one or
the other ethical theory were made but both were seen as part of a divinely ordered
natural system in which what was efficient was providentially designed to
correspond to virtue.' 67 As Balleisen observes, "when the economic dislocations of
the late 1830s and early 1840s created political pressures for revisions of debtor-
creditor law, and especially for the adoption of a national bankruptcy system, the
creed of 'the church commercial' guided the labors of congressional draftsmen."
INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 285 (The State Historical Society
of Wisconsin 1974)
[Tihe plunging, speculative, promoter type who came to typify the driving, high-risk
segment of American business after the Revolution unwittingly contributed to the
formation of attitudes essential to the acceptance of the discharge of debts. Initially the
old morality prevailed. . . . However, as the nineteenth century advanced more and
more Americans became tolerant of and indeed attracted to speculative ventures....
And so the pendulum of opinion swung from hostility to bankruptcy relief to an attitude
that mixed indifference with tolerance and outright approval.
166 See, e.g., BALLEISEN, supra note 161, at 165 ("In discussing the plight of bankrupts, commercial
moralists and their political allies emulated the rhetorical strategies of most antebellum reform
movements."); see JoEllen Lind, Symbols, Leaders, Practitioners: The First Women Professionals, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1327, 1335 (1994) (discussing reasons for rise of women's economical role during ante-bellum
America); Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household
Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1111 (1994) (noting that antebellum America "produced an equal
rights discourse that was confident of the value of women's work").
167 See, e.g., WILLIAM PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 60-62 (PUBLISHER
1785) (arguing that observation of nature is principal "method of coming at the will of God" by which we
can promote human happiness). Even though Paley was English, his work was one of the leading treatises on
ethics in ante-bellum America. See HOWE, supra note 22, at 465; see also Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of
the Fresh Start In Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 56, 98 n.294 (1990) (discussing great moral debate regarding Bankruptcy Act of 1841); Richard C.
Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing of American Capitalism, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 327 (1994)
(bringing down Congress' moral concerns in early 1940's). Even though Paley was English, his work was
one of the leading treatises on ethics in ante-bellum America. See HOWE, supra note 22, at 465; see also
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 455 n.169 (2000) (lauding Paley for his popularity in early nineteenth century);
FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE 250 (1851). The first edition of Wayland's work
was published in 1835 and was "the most widely used American textbook on moral philosophy." HOWE,
supra note 22, at 476.
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The congressional draftsmen in 1840 were the Whigs. 168 The Whig party was
led by northern industrialists and western nationalists who had organized for the
1832 election and attempted to pull together all of the opposition the reelection of
Andrew Jackson. 169 As articulated by Daniel Walker Howe,
Whiggery stood for the triumph of the cosmopolitan and national
over the provincial and local, of rational order over irrational
spontaneity, of school-based learning over traditional folkway and
customs, and of self-control over self-expression. Whigs believed
that every person had the potential to become moral or good if
family, school, and community nurtured the seed of goodness in his
moral nature. 
170
168 Daniel Webster was the principal draftsman of the 1841 Act. See Mark E. Steiner, Lawyers and Legal
Change In Antebellum America: Learning From Lincoln, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 427, 432-33 (1997)
(discussing Abraham Lincoln and Whig ideology); Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 519, 607 (2001) (acknowledging that the Whigs took over Congress in 1840); David P.
Currie, The Constitution In Congress: The Public Lands, 1829-1861, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 785 (2003)
(noting that Whig dynasty was short lived: "Of the nine presidential elections from 1828 to 1860, the Whigs
won only two (in 1840 and 1848)"). Daniel Webster was the principal draftsman of the 1841 Act. See F.
REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 138 (1919) ("The law of 1841 was largely the work of
Daniel Webster .. "). Webster took much of the Act, including the wage priority provision, from a recently
enacted Massachusetts statute. See An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, and for the more equal
distribution of their effects, ch. CLXIII, § 24, 1838 Mass. Laws. For hints of Webster's connection with
evangelicalism see DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 18 (1979)
("Whig political leaders like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster cultivated good public and private relations
with clerical opinion-makers."). But see id. at 222 ("Webster's own religious faith was bland, non-
theological, and ecumenical."); ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 87 (1997)
(quoting Webster's orthodox confession of faith written in 1807 as condition of membership in Salisbury
Congregational Church).
169 See 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 485 (4th ed. 1950) (1930); John A. Eidsmoe, Warrior, Statesman, Jurist for the South: The Life,
Legacy, and Law of Thomas Goode Jones, 5 JONES L. REV. 51, 60 (2001) ("The Whig party of the 1800's
was an amalgamation of former Federalists, conservative factions of the Democratic-Republican Party,
Southern cotton planters who opposed the leveling doctrines of Andrew Jackson and his followers, and
industrialists who wanted the protection of high tariffs."); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries
on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1300 (1985) ("[W]hen the nationalist opponents
of Andrew Jackson organized, they reached even further back into America's republican heritage, and called
themselves Whigs.").
17o MORISON & COMMAGER, supra note 169, at 485 (quoting LOUISE STEVENSON, SCHOLARLY MEANS
TO EVANGELICAL ENDS: THE NEW HAVEN SCHOLARS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER LEARNING
IN AMERICA, 1830-1890 5-6 (1986)).
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While the sets of evangelicals and Whigs were by no means identical,17" ' there was a
substantial overlap, especially in the North. 172 Desire to reform society in terms of
manners and decorum easily meshed with maintaining the Second Bank of the
United States and protective tariffs to enhance a broadening market economy.1
73
The continuing effects of the Panic of 1837 through the depression of 1839 attracted
the attention of evangelical preachers and Whig politicians.' 74 Various petitions to
Congress about the bankruptcy legislation help establish the moralized context of
Congressional action.175 A connection between evangelicalism and the Whig party
171 In other words, evangelical leaders were not mere theological water carriers for the Whig business
elites. See Stewart Allen Davenport, Moral Man, Immoral Economy: Protestant Reflections on Market
Capitalism, 1820-1860, at 33 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author)
It is also important to point out ... that all of the clerical economists, being the
intellectual disciples of Adam Smith that they were, strongly supported free-trade: a
position on national economic policy that was fundamentally at odds with the
predominant Whig agenda of high-tariff protection for America's nascent industries.
William W. Fisher HI, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-
1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 109 (1990) (discussing interaction between Whig Party and evangelical
Christians); Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classical Legal Thought, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1427,
1439 (1997) (mentioning split within evangelicals, some following Jacksonians rather than Whigs).
172 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 573 ("[Wle know that the Whig Party appealed to many members of
evangelical religious bodies."); Fisher, supra note 171, at 109 ("[T]he evangelicals helped mold-and
thereafter lent their support to-the platform of the political party soon to assume the label 'Whig."');
Hovenkamp, supra note 171, at 1439 (stating many northern Baptists remained Whig loyalists rather than
joining Jacksonians).
173 See MEMORIAL OF SILAS M. STILWELL AND OTHERS, CITIZENS OF NEW YORK, PRAYING THE
PASSAGE OF A GENERAL BANKRUPT LAW, S. Doc. No. 26-154, at 4 (1st Sess. 1840) (pleading for congress
to enact national economic plans, since "[tihe [current] laws compel a man to be dishonest"); Noll, supra
note 24, at 12 (using "formalist/antiformalist" division within early American Protestantism, the author states
that formalists generally felt a responsibility to use money for broad national projects). But see James
Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 235, 238 (1993) (discussing morality,
or lack thereof, in protectionism).
1 74 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 579
Indeed, evangelical preachers, like the Whig campaigners, had been calling attention to
the depression. The preachers saw it as a divine punishment visited upon the people for
their sins both individual and collective, including cupidity, fraud, violations of the
Sabbath, and injustice to the Indians .... [Whig presidential candidate William Henry]
Harrison specifically courted evangelical voters with assurances of his sabbatarian,
Anti-masonic, and temperance principles.
Daniel W. Levy, A Legal History of Irrational Exuberance, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799, 825-26 (1998)
(discussing relation of 1837 crisis to comprehensive bankruptcy scheme, protective tariffs, and distribution
of public lands that Whigs made part of their electoral platform); John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and
Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 427-28 (2000) (describing effect of
1837 crisis on politics and eventual adoption of bankruptcy laws by Whig government).
175 See, e.g., MEMORIAL OF A NUMBER OF CITIZENS OF NEW YORK, REMONSTRATING AGAINST THE
PASSAGE OF A RETROSPECTIVE BANKRUPT LAW, S. DOC. No. 27-36 (1 st Sess. 1841) (praying Congress not
assist those who were not too ambitious to be content with regular comforts of life); MEMORIAL OF A
NUMBER OF CITIZENS OF NEW YORK, REMONSTRATING AGAINST THE PASSAGE OF A RETROSPECTIVE
BANKRUPT LAW, S. Doc. No. 27-35 (arguing against passage of bankruptcy bill "that threatens to prostrate
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is undeniable and is an interesting precursor of the contemporary relationship of
evangelicals and the Republican Party. 176 Religious motivations for voluntary
bankruptcy in general would certainly have trickled down the wage priority in
particular.
With no success against Andrew Jackson or against Jackson's successor Martin
Van Buren in 1836, the Whigs by 1840 found themselves with a real prospect of
victory due to the lingering effects of the Panic of 1837. The decades preceding the
election of 1840 had seen many states eliminating requirements for the franchise
such as property ownership. 177 Given the increasing number of persons entitled to
vote, especially in the industrialized North, 178 the Whigs needed to broaden their
appeal to the newly enfranchised: "It was necessary to out-demagogue the
Democrats."'' 79 And one of the Whigs' means of reaching the non-elite masses was
to capitalize on the continuing depression 80 and support bankruptcy legislation.' 8'
The Whigs swept to victory with the election of William Henry Harrison and took
control of Congress. And the support of evangelicals for the Whigs was crucial.
82
Keeping their promise, "the Whig-dominated 27th Congress again created a federal
bankruptcy system, largely in the hope of attracting the political support of
thousands of American whose businesses had failed .... 183 The breadth of who
both the credit and the integrity of all classes"); Memorial of Silas M. Stilwell, supra note 173, at 2-5
(stressing need for comprehensive bankruptcy law to promote honesty in dealings).
176 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 9
Whig political culture was profoundly influenced by the Second Great Awakening, an
outburst of evangelical activity which ... sought to transform society along moral lines.
For the religious crusaders who led the temperance, peace, antislavery, missionary, and
other benevolent societies, it was not enough to win individual souls to Christ; society
as a whole must respond to His call. American Whigs, many of them members of the
evangelical sects, typically believed in the collective redemption of society ....
James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in Late Nineteenth Century
Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317, 355 (2001) (describing new Republican party
created from rift in Whig party over slavery expansion as "marriage" of secular politics and evangelical
morality). See generally Sean Wilentz, Bush's Ancestors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005 (tracing history of
current-day Republican Party from Whig/Christian evangelical start to conservative air that attaches to the
party today).
See HOWE, supra note 22, at 489 ("During the years after 1815, state after state abolished property
regTuirements for voting .....
8 See id. at 489-90.
179 MORISON & COMMAGER, supra note 169, at 555.
180 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 506 ("The depression [of 1839] gave the Whig Party a new lease on
life.").
181 See BALLEISEN, supra note 161, at 104 ("[A]s the presidential election of 1840 approached, Whig
leaders seized on bankruptcy reform as a leading issue for their campaign.").
182 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 580 ("Supporters and opponents of evangelical revivalism generally lined
up on opposite sides of the Whig-Democratic political debate . . . . The Whig party benefited from
evangelicals who decided to enlist the power of the state on behalf of reform.").183 BALLEISEN, supra note 161, at 102. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 31 (2001) ("The 1841 act was the brainchild of the Whig party, which had
made bankruptcy law a crucial plank of the platform that brought them the presidency and control of the
Senate the year before.").
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could be a debtor and the ability to seek voluntary bankruptcy relief confirmed the
Whigs' intent to retain the support of the many who suffered greatly from the
continuing economic depression.
184
Creation of the wage priority was consistent with the Whigs' rent-seeking
program for continuing electoral success. The wage priority also harmonized with
the family-centered moralism of ante-bellum evangelicals.185 As Balleisen observes
in connection with debtor obligations under the 1841 Act,
Drawn from the suggestions of bankruptcy reformers with ties to
commercial moralism, these disciplinary elements [e.g., voidability
of preferences] reflected a coercive impulse born of frustration with
the impacts of moral suasion-much as calls for prohibition of
alcohol grew out of impatience among temperance advocates with
the results of mere agitation. 
186
When one remembers that the evangelical commercial moralists spoke to the ethical
duties of creditors as well as debtors, it is reasonable to conclude that the wage
priority also grew out of similar sympathies. Just as debtors had a moral obligation
to pay, so creditors had a moral obligation to extend mercy. The former had long
received legal sanction; the latter was about to find its way into the law as well.
Even the epithet attached to the 1841 Act by its opponents-"Jubilee of the
Bankrupts"-pays homage to the biblical perspective in which the new law was
considered. 187 If the 1841 Act as a whole was perceived in terms of the release laws
recorded in Leviticus 25, it is likely that a biblically literate population saw the
184 See supra text accompanying note 33; see also BALLEiSEN, supra note 161, at 102 ("To curry favor
with these voters, the Whigs made bankruptcy discharges available to all citizens and allowed debtors as
well as creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings.").
185 See BALLEISEN, supra note 161, at 104 ("Taking their cue from both the commercial moralists and the
fervent demands of bankrupts, Whig leaders cobbled together a bill that gave all Americans the ability to
petition for bankruptcy relief.").
186 id. at 102.
187 Id. at 132
"Jubilee of the Bankrupts"-so one critic had derisively termed the 1841 Federal
Bankruptcy Act, and in hindsight, with considerable justification. In light of the
legislation's expeditious repeal, there is a strong temptation to deem it an ephemeral
showering of legal releases upon one generation of ruined proprietors, very much akin
to a biblical cancellation of debts.
The reference to "jubilee" is taken from Leviticus 25 where the Torah provided that every 50 years the
Israelites were to be freed from debt servitude and restored to their ancestral lands. See William Baur,
Jubilee Year, International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, http://www.bible-
history.com/isbe/J/JUBILEE+YEAR/ (last visited February 12, 2008); see also, John Fabian Witt, Narrating
Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 303, 332 (2003) ("Critics of bankruptcy feared that
legislation like that enacted in 1841 would instigate a 'Jubilee of the Bankrupts'-debtors would rush pell-
mell into the federal courthouses to be released from their obligations.").
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wage priority in terms of passages such as Leviticus 19:13,188 Deuteronomy
24:15,189 and James 5:4,190 each of which clearly enjoined the prompt payment of
wages.19' Other than payment of vows made to God, no specific financial obligation
received such frequent biblical mention as the duty to pay wages to workers. The
continuing moralization of the debtor-creditor relationship by ante-bellum
commercial moralists, consistent with a plain reading of the Bible192 in the context
of a market economy with a rising class of wage earners, carries considerable
weight in understanding the moral calculus of the wage priority of the 1841 Act.
And the references in judicial opinions prior to the Zurich American decision to the
particular needs of wage-earners and their families over the course of more than a
century suggest a continuing recognition of a normative moral principle underlying
the wage priority.
CONCLUSION
Neither the majority nor the dissent in the Zurich American opinion referred to
the principle of protection of employees and their families by prompt payment of
wages that had animated previous decisions in this field. The dissent's reticence is
188 See Leviticus 19:13 (King James) ("Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbour, neither rob him: the wages of
him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning.") All biblical quotes are from the
Authorized (King James) Version, the single translation commonly in use in nineteenth-century America.189 See Deuteronomy 24:15 (King James) ("At his day thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go
down upon it; for he is poor, and setteth his heart upon it: lest he cry against thee unto the LORD, and it be
sin unto thee.").
190 See James 5:4 (King James) ("Behold, the hire of the labourers who have reaped down your fields,
which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth: and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears
of the Lord of sabaoth."); WAYLAND, supra note 167, at 250 (quoting this passage in the context of directly
applicable contemporary morality).
191 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 3 ("[B]iblical religion then permeated the culture in ways both
conventional and sincerely felt.").
192 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 447
The Reformation principle of sola scriptura that the Bible contained all things
necessary for salvation and could be properly interpreted by any conscientious believer,
lived on and heavily influenced American culture. . . . Respect for the Bible
conditioned national identity, social criticism, natural science, the educational system,
and the interpretation of authoritative texts like the Constitution.
Mark A. Noll, The Image of the United States as a Biblical Nation, 1776-1865, in THE BIBLE IN AMERICA:
ESSAYS IN CULTURAL HISTORY 51 (New York: Oxford University Press 1982)
In the years between the American Revolution and the Civil War, the Bible offered to
many Americans a key for understanding not only private religious reality but also the
public life of the country. The Scriptures were so widely used that it is not inaccurate to
call the country a biblical nation during this period.
HOWE, supra note 22, at 475 ("The Bible occupied an even more prominent position in discussions of
morality than it did in education and science. Pre-Civil War Americans debating moral issues almost always
appealed to biblical authority.").
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understandable: There is little reason to conclude that a policy of protecting workers
from the vicissitudes of sudden unemployment would buttress awarding a priority
for workers compensation insurance. Workers compensation insurance itself is
consistent with the normative perspective of special protection for wage earners.
Yet priority for the premiums due from employers seems too indirect to draw the
same endorsement, especially when such a priority would dilute a state's lower
priority for taxes levied for the same benefit. If neither of the forms ofemployee
benefits addressed in Embassy Rest. (contributions to union welfare fund) or Joint
Indus. Bd. (contributions to employee's annuity plan) fell within the policy of the
wage priority, the more attenuated nature of workers compensation could scarcely
do so.
It is harder to understand the majority's silence. The Court's precedents had
confirmed the purpose of the wage priority as a means by which employees and
their families could get their daily bread. Each of the preceding six-member
majorities had also established the corollary that deferred employee benefits did not
fall within wage priority. Congress added section 507(a)(4) in 1978 only after
concluding that fringe benefits had frequently come to substitute for wages over the
course of the twentieth century. To be sure, employee benefits now enjoy a priority
but that extended priority did not arise from the moral milieu of the original wage
priority. Employee benefit plans did not have the same nexus to survival as did the
prompt payment of wages. And neither commercial moralists nor evangelical
activists played a role in sculpting the benefits priority. It is thus not surprising that
the majority balked at expanding the reach of employee benefits priority. It is
surprising that the opinion failed to acknowledge its consistency with a trajectory
beginning over 160 years earlier and regularly confirmed thereafter.
The policy of the wage priority is firmly grounded in the physical needs of
workers and their families. The justification of the wage priority certainly includes
this policy but its early history suggests there was more to it than simple
benevolence. The transformative moral vision of ante-bellum American
evangelicals believed in a foundation for that policy in a biblical-theological
understanding of the calling of the United States as God's tool of universal
reconciliation. Combined with the political calculations of the Whig party,
theology influenced law. Additionally, the existence of the wage priority suggests a
more full-orbed view of evangelical social action than is generally credited by
contemporary evangelicals or their opponents. The durability of the wage priority
suggests that at least some theological perspectives can be effectively translated into
broadly acceptable social policies through conversion to public reasons, a truth that
can inform contemporary debates on many issues.
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